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Kevin McCain

The Nature of Scientific Knowledge

An Explanatory Approach

 Springer

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For Quid, just because

Preface

The goal of this book is to provide a comprehensive and accessible introduction to the epistemology of science. To the degree that it is successful, this book introduces readers to epistemology in general as well as the particular nuances of scientific knowledge. The chapters that follow, while far from exhaustive treatments of the various topics, provide readers with a solid introduction to philosophical topics that will be of particular use for those seeking to better understand the nature of scientific knowledge.

My own understanding of the nature of scientific knowledge has greatly benefited from discussions with many colleagues and friends: Marshall Abrams, Jon Altschul, Bryan Appley, John G. Bennett, Mike Bergmann, Mike Bishop, Kenny Boyce, Brandon Carey, Eli Chudnoff, Christopher Cloos, Earl Conee, Brett Coppenger, Andy Cullison, Trent Dougherty, John Dudley, Rich Feldman, Bill Fitzpatrick, Richard Fumerton, Chris Gadsden, Jeff Glick, Alvin Goldman, David Grober-Morrow, Ali Hasan, Sommer Hodson, Kostas Kampourakis, Matt King, Court Lewis, Clayton Littlejohn, Todd Long, Jack Lyons, Peter Markie, Josh May, Matt McGrath, Andrew Moon, Alyssa Ney, Tim Perrine, Kate Phillips, Ted Poston, Jason Rogers, Bill Rowley, Carl Sachs, Greg Stoutenburg, Philip Swenson, Chris Tweedt, Jonathan Vogel, Brad Weslake, Ed Wierenga, Chase Wrenn, Sarah Wright, and several others. Thank you all.

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