

# Chapter 16

## Police Strategies for Dealing with Tribal Conflicts in Nigeria



Amos Oyesoji Aremu and Perry Stanislas

### Introduction

The question of insecurity globally is receiving much more attention given its increasing occurrence and the challenges it presents. More often, the affects of insecurity are not only grievous, harrowing and tragic, they are also multifarious and not uncommonly adversely impacts on some of the most vulnerable groups, who are often marginalized. These groups of people and the problems they experience are usually historical and geographical in character. The conflict of ethnic and other minority groups and their agitation for political and social inclusion is pronounced in many countries, and receive international attention; especially from the United States, the European Union, Britain and Russia inter alia. Many of the ethnic and tribal tensions in Nigeria have experienced similar exposure.

In this chapter, the agitation of tribal groups in Nigeria and policing strategies are interrogated with a view to reappraising Nigerian police effectiveness in providing security generally for society and specific groups within it. The chapter will first appraise the insecurity challenges confronting the country, especially in the last few years. Secondly, the chapter details the emergence of a policing framework that could be used to improve policing, particularly for ethnic/tribal groups and help to reduce tensions in Nigeria. The framework elucidates some of the fundamental problems facing the Nigerian police with serious ramifications for the quality of democracy in the country.

---

A. O. Aremu  
University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria

P. Stanislas (✉)  
Assistant Professor of Policing and Security, Rabdan Academy, Abu Dabi, UAE  
e-mail: [pstanislas@dmu.ac.uk](mailto:pstanislas@dmu.ac.uk)

## Nigeria and Contemporary Insecurity Challenges

Other than the economic challenges confronting Nigeria as a sovereign nation, the problems around insecurity has undoubtedly impacted negatively on the entire fabric of the country. This has brought untold hardships. The insecurity which initially aggravated in 2009 and later blossomed into a full blown terrorism motivated by *Boko Haram*, a Jihadist fundamental group in the North East, Nigeria has practically affected the entire North East and by extension, the entire country (Aremu 2015). At the root of this problem is the perceived regional and religious inequality, which intersects with ethnic and tribal identities around the impact of western education among Muslim communities in North Western Nigeria, and hostility towards the corrupt Federal Government (Ford 2014, Stanislas and Iyah 2016). *Boko Haram*-motivated terrorism more than any insecurity prior to 2009 in Nigeria was the most serious security challenge that almost brought the entire security apparatus to an operational halt. The Nigerian Police have been the worst hit of the security agencies given the ferocious *Boko Haram*'s terrorism which has been directed at them. The Nigerian Police not only lost its personnel, the institution also suffered losses in terms of arms, ammunition and stations. While it is difficult to estimate losses suffered by the Nigerian Police due to lack of records, it is believed that between 2009 and 2015 when *Boko Haram* is said to have been 'technically incapacitated' by the Nigerian Federal Government, the Police has lost about 525 personnel excluding civilians who were estimated to be 30,000 (see Azard et al. 2018). This also excluded the economic loss estimated to be millions of dollars.

The casualty figure is also put about 2.1 million people in internally displaced camps as of December, 2015 from 207 local government areas covering 13 states in Northern Nigeria including Abuja Adamawa, Bauchi, Benue, Borno, Gombe, Kaduna, Kano, Nasarawa, Plateau, Taraba, Yobe and Zamfara (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2016). Although the Database of Terrorism in Nigeria from 2009 to the present is unavailable, the Global Terrorism Index (2015) ranks Nigeria with a score of 9.213 as the third most terrorism ridden country after Iraq and Afghanistan out of 125 globally. The GTI data underscores the seriousness of terrorism in Nigeria.

The fight against *Boko Haram* has been hampered by the fundamental institutional weaknesses of the security services (primarily the police and army) which is characterized by poor salaries, endemic corruption, poor motivation, lack of appropriate equipment, nepotism and weak leadership (Ahmed and Eckel 2014). This is compounded by inappropriate tactics which rely on brutal methods and serious human rights abuse which alienates communities and replicates similar matters elsewhere, such as in Kenya. Walker (2014) citing a British military adviser attached to the Nigerian security services critically describes the government's approach of desperately searching for the 'big red button' rather than carrying out the hard and serious work of modernizing the police and military (see Mkutu and Stanislas *ibid*). At the heart of this reluctance is the inescapable observation that the Federal Government and politicians' self interests are rooted in the established order,

regardless of how poorly this serves the majority of citizens, regardless of ethnic and tribal affiliations.

In spite of the Federal Government of Nigeria's position that *Boko Haram*'s sect has been 'technically' defeated, concerns from security stakeholders on the seeming rejuvenation of *Boko Haram* indicates the contrary. Although, the sect given intelligence report is said to be split into two with the emergence of Sheikh Abu Musab Al-Barnawi, competing leadership with Sheikh Abubakar Shekau, it is still extremely dangerous going by the fact that it still operates albeit minimally (Aremu 2015). Up until the current time, the sect is still holding hostage, most of the Chibok girls who were captured more than 3 years ago. *Boko Haram*'s renewed 'strength' is still a major concern in Nigerian security circles.

Another security concern in Nigeria is the *Fulani* cattle-motivated killings that sprang up in Benue and Nasarawa states between the *Agatu* in Nasarawa and Benue; and nomadic *Fulanis* over land resource control. Of particular concerns is the strongly held beliefs among the affected ethnic and geographic communities that the slow if not sluggish response to this crisis, which has seen significant amount of loss of life and serious injuries, by the Federal Government and the police (who are centrally controlled) has been shaped by the tribal affiliation of the President and many of his inner circle who are from the Fulani ethnic/tribal group. This type of ethnic support network helps explain the arming of these herdsmen (with apparent heavy weaponry) and what could be perceived impunity which structures the environment in which they operate (Ochab 2018). Moreover, these suspicions can be understood in a cultural context of 'big' and powerful men sponsoring communal violence and individual assassinations to instrumentally maximize and protect their self interests (Stanislas and Iyah 2016).

These two insecurity challenges (*Boko Haram*-motivated terrorism and *Fulani* farmers predatory violence) not only brought Nigeria to the spotlight of insecurity globally, kidnapping and hostage-taking are equally prolific simultaneously across the country; especially in states like in North Central (especially Kogi State), South West and chiefly in the South. The latter's philosophy is quite different as it is motivated by pecuniary gains mainly as a result of widespread unemployment and poverty within the country that has driven many forms of crime such as violence caused by religious extremism (Stanislas and Iyah 2016, p.330–331).

The fourth in the scheme of insecurity challenges confronting Nigeria is the militancy in the South East and Niger Delta. While the philosophy of the two-pronged insecurity is toward self-determination, the significant loss of life and especially of oil installations in the most southern parts of the South has made it assume a more fearsome dimension because of its link to the poor economy. Conservatively, the militancy orchestrated by the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) from January 2016 to the current time has cost the country enormous amounts of barrels of oil in terms of its production. The NDA purportedly consists of individuals drawn from many ethnic/tribal groups who have been adversely affected by the ruthless oil producers, and its corrupt state agents. The plight of the Oguni people has acted as a rallying call for these militants and highlighted in the state killing of Oguni environmental activists Ken Saro Wira and his eight colleagues which received international

condemnation (Stanislas 2014, p. 209) This challenge of insecurity, especially involving the NDA is infiltrating the coastal areas of the South West states like Lagos and Ogunand thereby making life and property no longer safe in the region.

The totality of economic, social and psychological costs of insecurity in Nigeria as experienced during the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan, and currently in the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari, has not only overstretched the security agencies (especially the police), it has also made the Nigerian society distraught. Nigeria is therefore, security-wearied and her people psychologically frayed particularly in the North Eastern and South Eastern parts of the country; and by extension, other parts of the country. The increasing insecurity of life and property has made Nigeria according to the Global Terrorism Index (2016) as the third most insecure country in the world after Iran and Iraq. Nigeria is probably the most unsafe country in South Saharan Africa, given the spate of tribal conflicts (many of which have religious overtones) and security issues in parts of the country (Stanislas and Iyah *ibid*). The import of this as it affects the Nigerian nation is discussed in the latter part of this chapter. However, it is instructive to note early in this chapter that insecurity being discussed so far is internal security which is the operational responsibility and constitutional jurisdiction of the Nigerian Police.

## **Tribal Group's Agitation in Nigeria**

Nigeria is the most populous black Africa country with over 200 languages and multiple ethnic groups. These ethnic groups include: the Yoruba predominantly in the Southwest, the Hausa/Fulani in the North, the Igbo in the South East, and the Ijaw in the most southern parts of the South. Others are the Tiv, Idoma, Nupe, Urobo, Birom, Anang, Ebira, and a host of others. Expectedly, where such a diverse ethnic groups exist, conflicts of various types is a feature of life. Nigeria is no exception to inter and intra tribal conflicts. These conflicts, largely over resources and opportunities or territorial claims predated the independence struggles in Nigeria. According to Ebegbulem (2011), the history of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts in Nigeria is traced back to the colonial transgressions that forced the ethnic groups of the northern and southern provinces to become an entity called Nigeria in 1914. Ajayi and Owumi (2013) buttress this by noting that Nigerian nation is sharply divided along ethnic, religious and regional lines. Ajayi and Owumi's observations reflect the deep seated animosity that exists among different ethnic groups in Nigeria, it also underscores the yearning for self-determination; especially in the Southeastern part of the country since 1967 when Nigeria fought the civil war in response to the violence against the Igbo of the Eastern Region living in the northern part of the country (Stanislas and Iyah 2016, p. 328. The agitation for self-autonomy was championed by the former military Eastern Governor, Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu. The struggle for the agitation of the same cause continues under NnamdiKanu using the outlawed Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). IPOB

has also been labeled a terrorist group in the mould of Boko Haram by the Federal Government of Nigeria using the pronouncement of the High Court.

From this background, it can be presumed to aver that tribal issues in Nigeria will always engender conflict given the fact that Nigeria is a mere geographical expression of a forced marriage with diverse cultures, social background, religious affiliation and psychology of the people that make up each tribal group. These tribal conflicts have always threatened internal cohesion which most often heat up the polity of the country. This, often, stretches the human capacity of the Nigerian police. The intervention of the police, is also, often questioned by many of the tribal groups and leaders; especially when the police extra judicially respond to the security challenges posed by the tribes that are on the 'war path.'

## **The Nigerian Police and Security of a Distraught Society**

Police and policing are two intertwined concepts in criminal justice that scholars have extensively and continuously discussed, not only because of the place of importance that the concepts enjoy in literature, but also because of the attention that they draw in contemporary discussion in security globally. Right from the Peelian's years till now, policing as a concept and as a subset of criminal justice system has remained very significant part of discourse in literature and contemporary discussion. Although much if not all the literature in this respect is from Europe and America and perhaps from Asia in recent times, African perspectives of criminal justice and security with emphasis on police and policing are limited, albeit growing. Earlier scholars on police literature have focused on historical documentation of police and policing activities (Emsley 2009). While these cannot be said to address criminal justice and insecurity in true sense, the works of the likes of Tekena Tamuno (1970) have given the next generation of African police scholars like Alemika a solid foundation to develop their unique contribution. It was not until early 2000s that serious empirical investigations started emerging on the Nigerian Police and policing structure in Nigeria. The works of Aremu (2000, 2006, inter alia) Aremu et al. (2009), Aremu and Tejumola (2008), Aremu and Jones (2011) are instructive here. From thence, serious scientific analysis of the Nigerian police, the structure of the organization and performance of the rank and file takes the centre stage in the literature.

The Nigerian Police, from 1930's to the current era still possess critical features of its colonial past (Aremu 2014). The constitutional responsibilities of the Nigerian Police as contained in Part Two and Section 4 of the Police Act and Regulations are as follows:

- The prevention and detection of crime,
- Apprehension of offenders,
- Preservation of law and order,
- Protection of life and property,

- The due enforcement of all laws and regulations with which they are directly charged
- Performance of military duties within or without Nigeria as may be required by law.

These provisions as clearly as they are, bestow huge security responsibilities of Nigerian Police personnel (Aremu 2014). This also comes with greater responsibilities on the internal governance of the Nigerian Police authorities. Doing so, would improve policing effectiveness and could engender public trust which is lacking. Aremu (ibid) argues that public trust is not earned flippantly given the history of police ineffectiveness. However, in what appears like a way out, Purdy (2013) admonishes that public trust could be earned if the police would embrace what he refers to as the “three spirits”. These are: the police personnel, the government and the public. Essentially, policing effectiveness of the society should rest on this tripod.

From 2009 onwards Nigeria has witnessed a geometric decline in peace. According to Global Peace Index (GPI 2016), of the nine countries (excluding Syria) with the most internal conflict deaths in the world, Nigeria is ranked number four after Mexico, Iraq and Afghanistan. These figures underscore the level of criminality in Nigeria. As observed above, Nigeria has become an unsafe country. The degree of insecurity has reached an all-time high and has caused economic, social and psychological distress in the country.

Globally, the economic impact of violence in 2015 was estimated to be \$13.6 trillion in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms (GPI 2016). A fraction of these expenditures was for peacekeeping and peace building. This perhaps account for the rise of insecurity profile in 2016 in countries like Turkey, Germany, France, Sudan, Iraq, Libya, the US, Pakistan, and Nigeria. Specifically, Nigeria is getting more attention with the increasing insecurity in some parts of the country. Recently, the Government of the US declared 20 states in Nigeria unsafe and warned its citizens against visiting these places. These and other related factors undermine the wellness of a society. The outcome of this environment is both physical and psychological and has also impacted negatively on the image of the country globally given the rating of the country on both Global Terrorism and Peace Indexes.

The insecurity facing the country is classified as internal and therefore under the watch of the Nigerian Police. Nigeria has a weak police both in very fundamental terms: numbers of personnel, resourcing, its basic leadership and institutional ethos and intelligence capabilities. In this regard, Nigerian Police organizations exhibit many of the classic symptoms of former colonial police in South Saharan Africa and elsewhere (see Mkutu et al. 2017). Alluding to this, the former Nigerian Chief of Army Staff and the current Interior Minister, Gen. Bello Dambazau in a lecture delivered in November 2013 described the intervention of the military in counterinsurgency operations as an aberration and clear indication that the police are unable to carry out their basic legal and constitutional mandate as outlined in the Police Act of 1990 (Stanislas and Iyah 2016, see Jatto and Stanislas 2017). The Nigerian Police

are incapacitated in terms of personnel, logistical capacity and motivation to be able to deliver on their security mandate. This explains the potential usefulness of particular approaches to community policing.

## The Nigerian Police Strategies and Responses

According to Aremu (2013), the Nigerian Police embraced the philosophy of community policing at the intervention of President Olusegun Obasanjo following his state visit to Houston in America. This led to the beginning of community-oriented policing in Enugu State in February 2004 (Aremu et al. 2009). From thenceforward, the Nigerian Police has accepted the reality of community policing in its operations, albeit largely symbolically. The Nigerian Police has a Community Policing Unit at its headquarters in Abuja. While the Unit has been working hard at encouraging community policing principles at the police state commands through the Commissioners of Police, much in terms of its operational reality has been further undermined, on top of the many institutional problems faced which have already been elucidated above (see Alemiko 2010) and has been exacerbated by the increase in crime. Community policing should be designed to be peculiar to each society's fundamentals, culture and psychology. However, this can only be achieved under the basic conditions of: lack of political interference by the government and politicians, compliance with the constitution and law by police leaders and the ability to generate sufficient legitimacy among civil society in the police as an institution and the community approach to policing (Alemiko 2010, p. 19).

Writing on the concept, Purdy (2013), describes community policing as a natural extension of the process of reform and modernization of the police institution. Purdy's contention is premised on the notion that the idea of community policing itself is not entirely novel in the police in advanced liberal democratic societies and in some developing countries (see Stanislas 2019)<sup>1</sup>; it was a reaction to the increasing challenges of insecurity. The principle of community policing is therefore, to make it specific to the need of a particular society or neighborhood. It is not straight-jacketed given the fact that policing challenges vary according to the culture, psychology and needs of each society.

Purdy (2013) defines community policing as a partnership between the citizens and the police working towards safety and an enhanced quality of life for all. Cox and Wade (1998) describe community policing as collaboration between the police and members of the public, focusing on solving community problems and improving the quality of life in the community. Such a relationship between the public and the police is to make both responsive to the security needs of the society. Greene and Decker (1989) maintain that citizens who are less satisfied with police are less likely

---

<sup>1</sup>Contrary to prevailing belief colonial police were often unable to entirely police colonised territories and relied on indigenous structures in the co-production of policing or as in the case of St Lucia in the Eastern Caribbean relied on autonomous community stakeholders.

to be cooperative with police officers and less willing to share information critical to making police work more efficient.

The philosophy of community policing places responsibility on the police and the public. Robert Peel (1829) averred the police are the public and the public are the police; the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare. By the same token citizens can carry out most of the functions seen by many as being monopolized by the state police. This synergy is the hallmark of policing philosophy in liberal democratic societies. This has however, being eroded over the years given the fact in some societies; the police institution has 'alienated' itself from the public due to their prioritization of government and politicians needs over citizens. In Yoruba land in Nigeria, the police are referred to as '*agbefoba*' (those who do the bidding of only the authorities). In effect, as long as policing work is the sole preserve of the state police and not participatory with the willing involvement of members of the public, the philosophy of community policing is defeated.

Generally in literature, community policing has been variously described as neighborhood policing or police and the public working together in different ways. Beyond this, the most important principle of the philosophy of community policing is bringing the police and the public together with the sole aim of partnership in crime reduction or prevention. Some models of community policing restricts the role of citizens to a very limited and passive role, while others view citizens as co-producers of policing in terms of their active utilization and deployment of resources (Friedman 1992). In the approach advanced by Jatto and Stanislas (2017) for Edo State, Nigeria they recommend the establishment of very disciplined and well led voluntary auxiliary policing system that significantly reduces its reliance on state police at the local level, given its highly problematic and criminogenic nature. This policing approach gives control to communities and increases their capacity to prevent crime and protect themselves from external violent attacks. In Kenya, the Sungusungu tribal police system proved far more effective in reducing crime and corruption than the state police, and led to their redeployment and a more rational use of resources in communities who needed more police (Heald 2007).

What drives community policing is the need to proactively reduce crime in society. Effective crime reduction is therefore, a function of effective community policing. While effective community policing is a function of the willing public and police officers to cooperate to achieve a desired outcome. As part of the continued search for police effectiveness that the proposition of the 'Trinity Model' serves in the quest for police reform in Nigeria.

## **The 'Trinity' Policing Model: A Model for the Future**

All over the world, scholars and stakeholders have always theorized on the best policing approaches. It was an answer to this that led to the conceptualization of community policing in the US. This chapter has discussed community policing and

its relevance to policing effectiveness. Arguably and given its wide acceptance in America and Europe and in some parts of Asia (especially in India), it has been found to be very effective in limited contexts (Skolnick 1988; Sommerville' 2009). For example despite community policing having its origins in efforts to reduce the problems experienced by black minority communities in the US during the 1960s, which includes aggressive and violent policing, poor interactions with citizens and low legitimacy. Over 50 years later many of these problems remain a feature of policing black communities in parts of the country which led to formation of the campaign group Black Lives Matter. Both Berlin (2013) and Chappell (2015) highlight the resistance and countervailing trends within US police thinking and training against community policing in favor of militarized approaches to police work, with the tragic results that has contributed to the current crisis described by Camp and Heatherton (ibid).

The Nigerian Police has uncritically accepted community policing as an effective policing principle. Fundamentally, policing basics in Nigeria was associated with community approaches given the fact it was people that well-known in the community who were recruited into the native police. This was later adopted by the regional governments in the first republic. Eventually, the Nigerian Police was again unified (the first reunification was in April 1930 when the Northern Nigerian Police Force was unified with the Lagos Police Force and the Niger Coast Constabulary) with the absorption of the regional police under one body (Tamuno 1970). The major criticism against the regional police in the first republic was that the regional administration used the police to oppress the opposition.

Nigeria's flirtation with community policing should not mask the intrinsic commitment of the political class and police leadership and a significant number of rank and file officers to its dysfunctional police institution, which while ineffective in meeting the needs of citizens and most ethnic/tribal communities and regions, is instrumental in protecting their interests. Ikuteyo (2009) and Ordu et al. (2017) detail the experience of community policing in Nigeria and its predictable failings. Among the plethora of problems cited are interference of powerful individuals in using their influence in traditional ways to shape policing outcomes, inertia and resistance of police leaders and officers to change, financial constraints, and finally the deep public distrust of the police and its fundamental lack of legitimacy.

These feelings are not difficult to understand. In the recent 2019 general elections citizens informed the media how the police guarding voting stations suddenly 'disappeared' minutes before they were bombed, or set on fire or attacked by violent mobs (and by soldiers in some instances), and could not be found.<sup>2</sup> It is these features of Nigerian policing which contributed to Jatto and Stanislas' (2017) thinking in advancing a model of community policing that significantly reduces the involvement of the state police as the only feasible way to meet local people needs.

As an outcome of the continuous search for effective policing in Nigeria, the "Trinity" Policing framework was evolved with a view to capturing basic fundamentals that studies have found to have impeded policing effectiveness. There are three

---

<sup>2</sup><https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w96iaNgg9yA&t=1457s> 28 February 2019

core mutually-related conceptual strands in police literature globally: the police personnel, the governance of policing activities and the consumers of policing product. Purdy (2013) refers to this as the “three spirits” (the government, the police and the public). This I consider as a tripod of policing effectiveness. Aremu (2014) notes that it is instructive to conclude that effective and result-oriented policing rests squarely on the ‘Trinity’ (the government, the police and the public). The need for an effective, lawful and people-oriented police organization cannot be overemphasized (Aremu 2013).

As a consequence of these observations the idea of the ‘Trinity’ Model of policing was developed. It is important to explain the model using each component that forms the ‘Trinity’ and its function and inputs for effective policing. The first leg of the model is driven by police governance. Police effectiveness is determined by the quality of its internal inputs and processes and external governance (see Alemiko 2010: 11–17). This explains why governance constitutes the first intervention of the ‘Trinity’ Model of policing. More often than not, the quality of the police personnel and their productivity are dictated by the government in terms of funding the institution receives and the integrity and professionalism of its selection systems (Stanislas 2013a, b, p. 213–214). Purdy (2013) attests to this by stressing that without resources the police cannot be productive. However, without having good honest and robust selection processes money invested in recruiting and training more police officers is wasted when incompetence, nepotism and corruption is tolerated and rewarded, particularly among police supervisors, managers, and leaders who shape institutional culture (Mkutu et al. 2017, p. 185–186).

In Nigeria, the police institution has a special status under the constitution. The police institution until the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari had its own ministry, Ministry of Police Affairs. The police is now under the supervision of Interior Ministry although with a supervisory commission, the Police Service Commission. One of the challenges in this respect is the incessant changes of the leadership of the police which makes internal governance of the institution unstable. Over a 50 year period the Nigerian Police has been headed by 18 Inspectors General of Police (IGPs). This is an average of 2.7 years for each of the police IG.

Evidence from other former colonial police organizations suggest the high turnover of leaders illustrates institutional cultures of political expediency, both in how appointments are made and discarded, the lack of professional competence of post-holders which became glaringly apparent and or the absence of professional autonomy (Adebayo 2005; Hills 2007; Wayne 2010). This practice of expediently firing police leaders constitutes a danger and threatens internal security by weakening the police institution and partly explains the failure to curb Boko Haram’s activities (Aremu 2014). In effect, the first intervention of the model could hamper police effectiveness given the associated challenges. Aremu (2014) concludes that too much political interference may disorganize police commitment and organizational behaviour.

The second leg of the intervention of the ‘Trinity’ Model of Policing is the workforce. The quality of the personnel that constitute a police institution is a direct reflection of the operational working of the institution and its various systems. The quality of personnel is contingent on police recruitment policy, selection processes,

training content, and delivery and evaluation procedures (Stanislas *ibid*). Writing on this, Purdy (2013) argues that the hiring process should support the recruitment efforts and focus on individuals who meet the established criteria of ethics, intelligence, interpersonal skills, logical thinking, decision-making, psychological suitability and maturity (see Stanislas 2013a, 2014).

Writing in the same vein, Aremu (2014) contends that twenty-first century policing requires thinking outside the conventional box. He notes further that the police and its personnel, more than ever before, should be more proactive, intelligence-driven, solution-focused and develop problem-solving abilities. Recruiting higher caliber police officers to enact smarter policing strategies and tactics should be viewed as part of the broader process of professionalization and modernization, which includes improving the pay and conditions and general status of the police occupation to make it more attractive (Stanislas *ibid*). Eliminating nepotism and corruption is an essential dimension of this process of change (Mkutu et al. *ibid*) and reflected in the views of Aremu et al. (2009) who has called for a major paradigm shift in how Nigerian policing is seen.

Police effectiveness is determined by the quality of both its internal and external governance. This explains why governance constitutes the second effect of the 'Trinity' Model of policing. Related to the second tripod in the model is too much government interference in the police's internal governance. All over the world, police governance is heavily influenced by the powerful, which in many cases can be abused.

The last leg of the model is the public which Aremu (2014) refers to as the consumers of policing products. Police work is a function of the support base of members of the public. Unarguably, the public is the determinant of the quality of policing work in the society. The nature of the interaction between the police and public is critical. Robert Peel (1829) maintained that the effective carrying out of police functions and duties are dependent on public approval. However, it is important to underline the legitimacy of the police is not derived directly from their actions but by the behavior of government, which in turn shapes how the former operates (Bennett and Morabito 2006). With these three interventions- the police personnel, police governance and the public, 'Trinity' Policing Model could engender effective policing in the society if the interventions work optimally. The model is diagrammatically illustrated in Fig. 16.1:

In the model above, the three interventions are mutually inclusive and could through the intervening variables in the boxes (policies, funding, leadership *inter alia*) determine policing effectiveness. The feedback systems as shown in the model are also crucial to the outcome measure (police effectiveness) in the model.

## Rethinking Policing Work for Effectiveness in Nigeria

Nigeria as a country is going through a significant security challenges which have impacted negatively on many strata of its national life. Given these challenges and evident ineffectiveness of the Nigerian Police, there is a need to rethink policing

**The 'Trinity' Policing Model**




Fig. 16.1 The 'Trinity' policing model

work as operationalize by the Nigerian Police. The clarity is expedient in that other security agencies like the army, navy, air force, civil defense, Department of State Security Service, and others also engage in policing work. The Nigerian Police is arguably the only constitutionally empowered security institution in charge primarily of internal security. It also has a special role in contributing to ethnic and tribal harmony or helping to reduce tensions at bare minimum. In spite of this constitutional role of the police, all is not well with the institution. Policing work in Nigeria is daunting and burdensome as a result of challenges confronting the institution. With about 365,000 police personnel and a population of more than 175 million people, the population size of police to civilian ratio is 1: 480. This indicates that the country is under-policed and a far cry from the United Nations recommended standard. With the population projected to be 186.9 million people in 2016 (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2016) and no corresponding increase in the number of police personnel in Nigeria, it is worrisome to suggest that police effectiveness could be very difficult to achieve.

Nigerian policing like in other former colonial jurisdictions and in South Sahra Africa in particular is reliant on relatively out of date ways of viewing law enforcement, particularly given the range of technologies and strategies which are available. Intelligence Led Policing as a policing concept and practice is solution-driven geared towards public safety using information and dissemination (Aremu 2014). ILP is also potentially useful in the context of s police and community collaboration for effective security interventions, however this comes with much caution as one of the major criticisms of CP is that is used primarily for intelligence gathering and not meeting the needs of communities and citizens. This illustrates the need for a fundamental organizational change and a much needed paradigm shift in how public safety is conceived and perceived in Nigeria in order for these techniques to be used in legitimate ways (Aremu 2015).

ILP, within a context of the types of broader organizational changes already highlighted, would help the Nigerian Police to reposition itself to engage in policing by brain and less policing by force. The Nigerian Police realize this by removing the word, 'Force' from its name some years, although this has been more symbolic than real. Policing in other climes especially in Western Europe, the US and former developing nations such as Dubai is by brain, third-eye (Close Circuit Television) and public engagement. Emphasis on ILP can be again be inferred from Ratcliffe's (2008) definition as a conceptual model that uses crime analysis and criminal intelligence in a strategic manner to determine offenders for targeting and or preventative measures. The Nigerian Police need to add more value to its operations. This requires paradigm shift from the former colonial policing model to value-added policing (see Mkutu et al. 2017).

Value-added policing is a potential outcome of the 'Trinity' Policing Model. To add value to policing work in Nigeria, the three core elements of the personnel, police governance and the public would have to be reengineered for desired results and significantly improve community relations, especially where ethnic and tribal matters are concerned. This model contributes to policing effectiveness especially in Nigeria where the three elements are at variance with one another – the police are

suspicious of the public, while the public dislikes the police; and the state's interference and underfunding and mismanagement of the police institution does either party any favours. A fundamental inference from the philosophy of the model is to harness the three interventions to promote police effectiveness and legitimacy. The model is therefore, a seamless and strategic determinant of police effectiveness.

## Conclusion

This chapter encapsulates the need for criminal justice reform with emphasis on the Nigerian Police's approach to internal security as it relates to tribal conflict. The chapter is motivated to interrogate this matter with a view to addressing insecurity posed by tribal conflicts and Nigerian police's responses and contribution to many of these problems. In doing so, the chapter gleans from a policing philosophy, community policing and explores, the 'Trinity' Policing Model. The crucial preconditions of wholesale institutional change required to make the model realizable is also critically explored.

Obviously the security challenges that are often cause by tribal conflict in Nigeria should be reappraised with a view to addressing the institutional deficiencies and operational laxities of the Nigerian police's and its contribution to these problems. These are best addressed by the police who are constitutionally empowered to ensure internal security. There is no doubt that Nigeria needs to address the challenges confronting the police for the institution to be repositioned for paradigm shift which can assist crime reduction. To address the problem of police ineffectiveness given the rising profile of insecurity in Nigeria, especially where tribal and ethnic and regional issues are concerned, and the general poor quality of service received by the public. The second intervention in the 'Trinity' Policing Model, police governance will have to be well addressed. This is not exclusive of the other two interventions (the police and the public). The challenges here are police culture, governance and public attitude as addressed in the chapter.

With the above still on the burner, security stakeholders will continue to address the problem of police effectiveness and responses. This challenge will continue to exercise the minds of both police practitioners and researchers beyond the political will to drive the needed policies for the expected paradigm shift in Nigerian policing. Ordinarily, police are expected to provide safety to citizens by proactively fighting crime and maintaining public order. This cardinal security responsibility of the police can only be achieved when the personnel are well-motivated and properly supervised and managed. Until then police effectiveness and responses would continue to be a mirage in Nigeria given the range of problems highlighted in the chapter.

## References

- Adebayo, D. (2005). Perceived workplace fairness: Transformational leadership and motivation in the Nigerian police: Implications for change. *International Journal of Police Sciences & Management*, 7(2), 110–121.
- Ahmed, I. & Eckel, M. (2014). Vox exclusive: Nigerian officers says corruption hampers fight against Boko Haram. [www.voanews.com](http://www.voanews.com). 30 May. Retrieved 14 March 2019.
- Ajayi, J. O., & Owumi, B. (2013). Ethnic pluralism and internal cohesion in Nigeria. *International Journal of Development and Sustainability*, 2(2), 926–940.
- Alemiko, O. E. (2010). *Enhancing police accountability systems in Nigeria: The missing link, enhancing accountability systems in the Nigerian police*, Cleen Foundation.
- Aremu, A. O. (2000). Psychological assessment of the problem-solving skills of Nigerian police officers. *Ife Journal of Psychology*, 2(1), 1–8.
- Aremu, A. O. (2006). The effect of two psychological intervention Programmes on the improvement of interpersonal relationships of police officers in Osogbo, Nigeria. *Criminal Justice Studies*, 19(2), 139–152.
- Aremu, A. O. (2013). The impact of emotional intelligence on community policing in democratic Nigeria: Agenda setting for National development. In A. Verma, D. K. Das, & M. Abraham (Eds.), *Global community policing: Problems and challenges* (pp. 25–40). Boca Raton: CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group.
- Aremu, A. O. (2014). *Policing and terrorism in Nigeria: Challenges and issues in intelligence*. Ibadan: Stirling-Horden Publishers Ltd.
- Aremu, A. O. (2015). Police planning to curb insurgency in Nigeria: The need for a strong and effective police-public partnership. In J. F. Albrecht, M. C. Dow, D. Plecas, & D. K. Das (Eds.), *Policing Major events: Perspectives from around the world* (pp. 115–124). Boca Raton: CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group.
- Aremu, A. O., & Jones, A. A. (2011). Improving commitment and productivity within the Nigerian police. In J. F. Albrecht & D. K. Das (Eds.), *Effective crime reduction strategies: International perspectives* (pp. 261–280). Boca Raton: CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group.
- Aremu, A. O., & Tejumola, T. O. (2008). Assessment of emotional intelligence among Nigerian police. *Journal of Social Sciences*, 16(3), 221–226.
- Aremu, A. O., Pakes, F., & Les, J. (2009). Locus of control and self-efficacy as means of tackling corruption in Nigeria. *Policing: An International Journal of Police Science & Management*, 11, 1–19.
- Azard, K., Crawford, E., & Kaila, K. (2018). *Conflict and violence in Nigeria: Results from the north east, North Central, and South Central zones*, The World Bank.
- Bennett, R., & Morabito, M. (2006). Determinants of constables perceptions of community support in three developing Nations. *Police Quarterly*, 9(2), 234–265.
- Berlin, M. (2013). An overview of police training in the United States, historical development, current trends and critical issues. In P. Stanislas (Ed.), *International perspectives on police education and training*. London: Routledge.
- Chappell, A. (2015). Police training in America. In P. Stanislas (Ed.), *International perspectives on policing education and training* (pp. 274–288). London: Routledge.
- Cox, S. M., & Wade, J. E. (1998). *The criminal justice network: An introduction*. Boston: McGraw-Hill.
- Ebegbulem, J. (2011). Ethnic politics and conflicts in Nigeria: Theoretical perspective. *Khazar Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, 14, 76–91.
- Emley, C. (2009). *The great British Bobby*. London: Quercus.
- Ford, J. (2014). *The origins of Boko Haram*. [www.nationalinterest.org](http://www.nationalinterest.org).
- Friedman, R. (1992). *Community policing: Comparative perspectives and prospects*. London: Macmillan.

- Global Peace Index. (2016). The global peace index records a historically less peaceful and more unequal world. Institute for Economic and Peace.
- Global Terrorism Index. (2015). *Institute for Economics and Peace*. [www.economicsandpeace.org](http://www.economicsandpeace.org).
- Global Terrorism Index. (2016). *Institute for Economics and Peace*. [www.economicsandpeace.org](http://www.economicsandpeace.org).
- Greene, J. R., & Decker, S. H. (1989). Police and community perceptions of the community role in policing. The Philadelphia experience. *Howard Journal of Criminal Justice*, 28(2), 105–123.
- Heald, S. (2007). Controlling crime and corruption from below: Sungusungu in Kenya. *International Relations*, 21(2), 183–199.
- Hills, A. (2007). Police commissioners, presidents and the governance of security. *Journal of African Studies*, 45(3), 409–423.
- Ikuteyo, L. (2009). Challenges of community policing in Nigeria. *International Journal of Police Sciences*, 11(3), 285–293.
- Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre Annual Report. Quarterly Update, July, 2016.
- Jatto, A., & Stanislas, P. (2017). Contemporary territorial, economic, and political security in Edo state, Nigeria. *Geopolitics, History and International Relations*, 9(2), 118–140.
- Mkutu, K., Stanislas, P. & Mogire, E. (2017). Book conclusion: State and non state policing: The challenge of postcolonial political and social leadership: Building inclusive citizenship, safety and security in East Africa, in Mkutu, K. (ed.) *Security Governance in East Africa*.
- Ochab, E. (2018). Trump may not be wrong on the Fulani herdsmen crisis in Nigeria, [www.forbes.com](http://www.forbes.com). 4 May. Retrieved 12 March 2019.
- Ordu Enyidah-Okey, G. & Nnamu, M. (2017). Community policing in Nigeria: A critical analysis of current development, *International Journal of Criminal Justice Sciences* 12(1) January 1-June.
- Purdy, D. W. (2013). Community policing: Theoretical problems and operational issues. In A. Verma, D. K. Das, & M. Abraham (Eds.), *Global; community policing: Problems and challenges* (pp. 1–24). Boca Raton: CRC Press Taylor & Francis Group.
- Ratcliffe, J.H. (2008). Intelligence-led Policing: Trends and issues in crime and criminal justice, 248, 1–6.
- Robert, P. (1829). The metropolitan police act.
- Skolnick, J. (1988). *Community policing: Issue and practices around the world*, University of Michigan Library.
- Sommerville, P. (2009). Understanding community policing. *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management*, 32(2), 261–277.
- Stanislas, P. (Ed.). (2013a). *International perspectives on police education and training*. New York: Routledge.
- Stanislas, P. (2014) Transforming St Lucian policing through recruit training in a context of high crime. In: Stanislas, P. (ed.) *International perspectives on police education and training*. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 209–234.
- Stanislas, P. (2019). The changing perceptions of St Lucian policing: How St Lucian police officers view contemporary policing. Submitted October 2018 to *Police, Research, and Practice*. Accepted.
- Stanislas, P., & Iyah, I. (2016). Changing religious influences, young people, crime and extremism in Nigeria. In K. Sadique & P. Stanislas (Eds.), *Religion, faith and crime*. Palgrave.
- Tamuno, T. N. (1970). *Police in modern Nigeria*. Ibadan: University of Ibadan Press.
- United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2016). *Population division*.
- Walker, A. (2014). *Why Nigeria has not defeated Boko Haram*. [www.bbc.co.uk](http://www.bbc.co.uk) 14 May. Retrieved 14 March 2019.
- Wayne, R. (2010). *Lapses and infelicities: An Insider's perspective of politics in the Caribbean*. St Lucia: Star Publishing Co Ltd Lucia.