Challenges in Controlling, Combating, and Preventing Corruption in Developing Countries

Branislav Simonović

Introduction

It is usually emphasized in literature that corruption became a subject of serious scientific research in earnest in the 1990s and that the World Bank and nongovernmental organizations, like Transparency International, that began to openly discuss, measure, and analyze corruption significantly contributed to the process (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016: 36). The interest for corruption studies in developing countries can be related to the development of globalization during the 1990s and in the years that followed. As the third world countries' markets as well as former communist countries' markets opened, numerous possibilities were created for expanding of trade and investments in the countries rich with resources and population (Potz et al., 2016: 82). One of the obstacles which has emerged is corruption, and it increases the price of work, encourages organized crime, compromises the legitimacy, and weakens the economy.

There is no doubt that corruption exists in all the countries in the world. While it persists in the developed countries and democracies, in the developing countries, it flourishes. There is a qualitative and quantitative difference between the corruption in developed and the corruption in developing countries. However, corruption differs among the developing countries themselves. Why do some (developing) country democracies experience more corruption than others (Treisman, 2000: 399)? Scholars have tackled this question by studying how various social and cultural factors, economic policies, institutions, and the rule of law are related to corruption (Yadav, 2012: 1028). If a phrase from Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina* is paraphrased (Tolstoy, 1996), "Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way," and applied in the subject of the corruption in the developing countries, it could be said that the corruption in each one of them is a destiny, an accident,

B. Simonović (✉)
School of Law, University of Kragujevac, Kragujevac, Serbia

and a sad story of a country and its people who are connected to ineffective state systems on one hand and unscrupulous and greedy politicians on the other.

The most frequently stated definition of corruption is that it is "the abuse of (public, or entrusted) power for personal gain (Treisman, 2000: 399; Transparency International 2016; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016: 36) or for the benefit of a group to which one owes allegiance" (Camaj, 2013: 22), which emphasizes greed of those who have the authority and the power. The essential element of corruption is unlawful use of power, or the abuse of power. Greed (abuse of law and abuse of authorities) of those in power is not controlled and prevented enough in the developing countries, since the institutions in these countries are not completely independent, professional, and effective. The corruption in developing countries can be observed as the system's weakness, governance failure, and institutional dysfunction (World Bank, 2000: 4). However, it appears that historical and cultural aspects of corruption shouldn't be neglected either.

The main initiator of corruption in developing countries lies within the political system. "It is predominantly an assessment of corruption within the political system, and covers most common forms of corruption" (Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2015: 15). A rigid, closed, and nondemocratic political system represents a trigger of corruption, while long democratic tradition represents barrier for corruption. Treisman stated that "While the current degree of democracy was not significant, long exposure to democracy predicted lower corruption" (Treisman, 2000: 399). The developing countries with high corruption rate have the lack of democratic tradition as a rule.

Apart from lack of democratic tradition, processes of transition also have a deep impact on corruption in developing countries. It has been shown in practice that the transition involves many factors that generate corruption. The process of transition represents the collapse of political, economical, and traditional system and the creation of new system, new society, and new values. "In the transition countries, the shift from command economies to free market economies has created massive opportunities for the appropriation of rents (that is, excessive profits) and has often been accompanied by a change from a well-organized system of corruption to a more chaotic and deleterious one" (Fokuoh Ampratwum, 2008: 81). Negative effects of transition process and its impact on corruption flourishing were clearly manifested in former socialist countries during the transition from a planned economy to a market economy (for the example of Kazakhstan, see Nurgaliyev et al., 2015), former colonies in postcolonial period during the creation of independent countries (e.g., see Angeles and Neanidis, 2015), and after the wars and armed conflicts during the periods of receiving foreign aid and reconstruction of both physical infrastructure and public institutions (Doig and Tisne, 2009). Moran emphasizes that the processes of transition have been evident in the various forms of democratization: transition from authoritarian rule, transition from communism, decolonization, and the emergence of new nation-states (Moran, 2001: 379).

Economic consequences of corruption in developing countries are serious. Corruption disables or decelerates the development. In literature, it is described as "economic cancer" (cited by Uberti, 2016: 318) which has "corrosive effect to the

development of a state" (cited by Charron, 2011: 68). Furthermore, there is a relation between the poverty and corruption. "Extensive research shows that poor countries are associated with substantially more corruption than their wealthier counterparts" (Chang and Golden, 2010: 11). In some developing countries, the corruption rate is extremely high. These countries are among the poorest of the world, leading many development experts to view corruption as one of the most threatening and pervasive obstacles to alleviating global poverty (Blackburn, 2012: 402). A cursory inspection of the data reveals that many of the most poor and corrupt countries in the past are among the most poor and corrupt countries today. This conjures up the idea of poverty traps and the notion that some countries may be drawn into a vicious circle of widespread deprivation and wholesale misgovernance from which there is no easy escape (Blackburn, 2012: 404).

Manifold harmful consequences emerge from corruption in developing countries, and they complicate forming of democratic institutions, the rule of law, and a just and rightful community. "Corruption has been blamed for the failures of certain 'developing' countries to develop… corruption is viewed as one of the main obstacles that post-communist countries face in attempting to consolidate democratic institutions and open, market economies" (cited by Treisman, 2000); it "undermines democratic institutions, ethical values and justice, inflicts damage to the sustainable development and the rule of law" (UN General Assembly resolution, 2007; Nurgaliyev et al., 2015: 140). It leads to violations of human rights, distorts markets, erodes the quality of life, and allows organized crime, terrorism, and other threats to human security to flourish (UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, cited by Fokuoh Ampratwum, 2008: 76). In addition, corruption often creates a hugely inequitable distribution as it favors those individuals and firms with political connections or the best "corruption technology" rather than those with the highest skills or the most efficient production technology (Kis-Katos and Schulze, 2013: 79).

Corruption Conceptualization in Developing Countries

The efficiency in corruption control varies significantly in different countries of the world. Corruption as illegal and immoral behavior exists in all states of the world, but the extent of its manifestation, its presence in different social layers, citizens' attitude toward it, and the reaction of a country and its efficiency of anti-corruption measures greatly vary in developed countries with long democratic tradition in comparison to developing countries with no democratic tradition and no independent institutions.

The research shows that anti-corruption measures do not have desired effect in developing countries, and they do not decrease corruption rate significantly, although the same measures are effective in developed countries. "The most frequent approach has until today been to use the 'tool kits' of ideas provided by the international community in line with the logic of a 'one-size-fits-all' approach" (cited by: Persson et al., 2013: 451). Neoliberal approach does not see the difference

among the various historical factors which affected the development of corruption in developing countries (Fokuoh Ampratwum, 2008: 78). Corruption is observed as a contemporary phenomenon in a given country, and it should be tackled with standard set of measures estimated as optimal by the countries with developed democracy and the international anti-corruption bodies (such as Transparency International, 2000). The recommended measures are, in essence, in accordance to Klitgaard's formula: $C = M + D − A$, that is, corruption equals monopoly *plus* discretion *minus* accountability. They generally comprise reduction of the monopoly and discretionary powers of officials, increase of the possibility of catching the perpetrator, higher accountability of officials, higher wages, better working conditions, etc. (Klitgaard, 1998).

In the attempt to provide the answer to the question why anti-corruption reforms in countries plagued by widespread corruption fail, Persson et al. state that they are based on a theoretical mischaracterization of the problem of systemic corruption. More specifically, the analysis reveals that contemporary anti-corruption reforms are based on a conceptualization of corruption as a principal-agent problem (Persson et al., 2013: 449).

Principal-Agent explanation of Corruption in Developing Countries

Principal-Agent (P-A) model is the most common explanation of corruption in literature. Its characteristic is not making the difference in corruption among the developed democracies, developing countries, autocratic regimes, etc. On the other hand, fundamental anti-corruption strategies and practical anti-corruption initiatives present in international community are based on this model.

The model is based on the interactions and interrelations between the principal (P) and the agent (A). The principal is superior, and it can be one person or a collective body (government, ministry, governmental body, managerial board on any level of social hierarchy) which has confided its jobs to the agent. "More specifically, in line with this view, a collective body of actors is assumed to be the principal who delegates the performance of some government task to another collective body of actors, the agents" (Persson et al., 2013: 452). The problems arise on the level of information asymmetry when the principal is unable to monitor the agent adequately, when the agent doesn't inform the principal about all the important matters, or when the agent betrays the interests of the principal. The agent becomes involved in corruption and performs the tasks for private benefit (and not for the benefit of the principal, authority, or public) because the gained benefit outweighs the consequences in the case of getting caught in corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Klitgaard, 1988). Bearing in mind the risk of betrayal of interests (abuse of trust by agent), the principal should control the work of the agent by using anti-corruption strategies: monopoly decrease and decrease of discretionary privileges, increase of

transparency, greater responsibility, etc. Corruption appears when the principal is not capable of controlling the agent's actions (Bauhr and Nasiritousi, 2012:554).

According to this model, the citizens are the principal, and civil servants are agents working for the citizen's welfare, which is the case in the societies with developed democracy and democratic tradition. Citizens choose and change the government on democratic elections, and the government representatives are expected to act in the interest of citizens. "The usual agency view is that a government official is the agent and citizens or the superiors of the government official are the principals who need to design incentives and controls to prevent the government official from asking for bribes" (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016: 42).

There are numerous problems in the application of this model in practice when it comes to understanding of corruption and its suppression in developing countries. Firstly, principal-agent model implies that the principal is always benevolent, with good intensions and not corrupt. However, the model becomes useless in the societies where corruption is endemic, and it has entered all the layers of society, as well as government and all institutions, which is a characteristic of developing countries. In that case, there is no principal which can control the agent, since the principal itself is corrupt. "By implication, if the supposed principal is also corrupt and does not act in the interest of the public good, the principal–agent framework becomes useless as an analytical tool since there will simply be no actors willing to monitor and punish corrupt behavior" (Fokuoh Ampratwum, 2008: 77; Persson et al., 2010; Persson et al., 2013: 452; Carson and Prado, 2016: 57).

In the developing countries, citizens have never had the role of a principal. From a historical point of view, they were the subjects and servants of slaveholders, colonialists, the rich, the powerful, and subjects in communist regime. In those countries there is no tradition of democratic society in which the citizens decide and which can successfully control the corruption of the authorities and those with power. Real mechanisms which citizens can use for successful corruption control are very limited. This can be observed in the practice of elections in developing countries where politicians involved in numerous corruption scandals remain in power for years (e.g., Carson and Prado, 2016: 57). Real position of citizens in developing countries is still far from the point where they can be seen as principals in accordance to this theory. The fact is that the politicians make promises about combating corruption within their election campaigns and treat it as one of the priorities (which is not sincere in most cases). In developing countries, this raises citizens' hope that they can influence corrupt politicians. Occasionally, there are public protests against the corrupt politicians (e.g., during years 2016 and 2017, there were protests in Romania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, in the Dominican Republic, etc.). Street protests of the citizens against corrupt politicians imply that the citizens are aware that they should combat corruption. On the other hand, they imply that the citizens do not trust the systemic institutions which are supposed to combat corruption. Street protests of the citizens against the corrupt ruling politicians show the inability of the systemic institutions through which citizens should realize their role of principals.

Patron-Client Explanation of Corruption in Developing Countries

Patron-client relations are relations of exchange between individuals of unequal status: in the simplest model, "patrons" enjoy privileged access to state-created resources (e.g., property rights and economic rents), while "clients" gain access indirectly through their personal relationships to "patrons" (Uberti, 2016: 328).

The explanation of corruption based on patron-client relation is a far better explanation for the existence of corruption in developing countries than the previous theory. This understanding starts from the fact that corruption in developing countries has deep historical, social, economic, and cultural roots and that it cannot be understood if it is observed exclusively as institutional failure.

The origin of specific patron-client relations can be found in traditional societies. Clientage emerges from traditional relations of authority in agrarian that is preindustrial societies. In these settings, authority is based on traditional patterns of loyalty, fealty, and deference and is cemented through nonreciprocal forms of exchange involving the "distribution of material resources and perks, distributed and consumed as though they were the private property of the ruler" (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007: 3; Uberti, 2016: 328).

Historic roots and specificity of patron-client relation vary in different countries of the world and/or regions in the distribution of political power between different groups of civil society. There is a description of specificities of patron-client relation model in some parts of Asia (Khan, 1998; Uberti, 2016), Africa (Hope, 2000), Mexico, and Latin America (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007:182–226), as well as the description of transition processes according to this model in postcommunist societies (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007: 227–250). Apart from the differences, there are evident mutual characteristics of patron-client relation in given countries. This relation survived industrialization process and adapted to current conditions in given countries and the specificities of social economic relations, and it had the strong impact on, among other things, creation and maintenance of corruption.

When the former colonial countries have become independent (Angeles and Neanidis, 2015), and after the fall of communist systems, the power was assumed by the elite groups which, at the moment of changes, have accumulated capital and had resources and/or power under their control. True democratization of society, the development of democratic institutions and control in accordance with the laws could not be achieved in such conditions. Newly appointed ruling structures were in favor of keeping and nourishing the patron-client relation as a relation of essential social, economic, and political dependence and inequality in the society.

Kitschelt and Wilkinson emphasize that due to their interest to remain in power and have privileges, politicians consciously delay the reforms and liberalization of economics, keeping the means of influence on economy and other processes within the countries they are ruling by keeping the patron-client relation (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007: 3). Hope, on the example of Africa, emphasizes that "Along with the emergence of the patrimonial state came the expanded role of state activity.

Economic decision-making became centralized and public enterprises proliferated. This resulted in an expanding bureaucracy with increasing discretionary power which was put to use as a conduit for graft. Public enterprises then became a playground for corruption and state intervention in economic affairs was the precipitating cause of such a situation" (Hope, 2000: 20).

Irrespective of the differences which exist in the developing countries, patrimonial relations are based on the loyalty networks which have their own hierarchy pyramids and on top of which is a patron who can be one person (a president of a country or prime minister) or a collectivity (royal family, ruling party, ruling ethnical group). Systems of subordination and loyalty are based on networks which are directed from the top of the pyramid (government, ruling party, etc.) to the bottom where there are local authorities, local communities, and legal entities. Higher position within the pyramid (closer position to the patron and ruling structures or better position in ruling party) enables gaining a smaller or greater share of power (formal or informal), more privilege, easier access to profitable business, possibility to take bigger corrupt amounts taken during the work in civil service sector, and higher level of being "untouchable" for the formal control institutions and anti-corruption agencies.

Uberti emphasizes patronism as a privileged approach to resources which comprises all the levels of society starting with the microlevel of local bureaucracy, through central country's level, up to the international level. In such conditions corruption is rooted in all structures of the social hierarchy, it has an endemic character, and it is common in the developing countries in the processes of capitalistic transition (Uberti, 2016: 335–339).

While describing neo-patrimonial forms of social organization in African countries, Hope, says: "This exercise of state power has led to the supremacy of the state over civil society and, in turn, to the ascendancy of the patrimonial state with its characteristic stranglehold on the economic and political levers of power, through which corruption thrives for it is through this stranglehold that all decision-making occurs and patronage is dispensed. Such is the pervasiveness of the patrimonial state in Africa that the citizenry have adapted to it. Individuals, as well as those people in positions of authority and/or influence, tend to shift their loyalties and political allegiances to the ruling regime of the day for reasons of personal survival and economic gain" (Hope, 2000: 19). Where neo-patrimonial politics was less pervasive and governments more committed to development and to limiting corruption, as in Botswana, corruption was lower and growth and investment were higher (Coolidge & Rose-Ackerman, 2000, cited by Rock and Bonnett, 2004: 1012, note 15).

In Latin America neo-patrimonialism is reflected in the form of hyper-presidentialism. Hyper-presidentialism is defined as a system of government with strong presidents facing limited institutions. Much of the literature on corruption in Latin America focuses on the role of hyper-presidentialism in very costly high-level political corruption. "… in a significant number of cases presidents in this region have harnessed… the whole apparatus of the state to the task of their personal enrichment" (Whitehead, 1989, 2000, cited by Rock and Bonnett, 2004: 1001).

In former communist (socialist) countries which entered the process of capitalistic transition, neo-patrimonialism is visible through the great level of control which the presidents, prime ministers, and presidents of ruling political parties have over all the institutions and processes in the country, especially in areas of human resources and control of public goods and resources. All the significant and well-paid positions in civil service and public sector (on all the levels, from local community to the government) are, by the rule, available to the members of ruling party or people connected to them. Connection to the ruling party or politicians is rewarded with the good positions, high salaries, good business opportunities (even though they are on the edge of being illegal or are illegal), and, more importantly, protection from all kinds of control, especially tax control.

Political Will to Combat Corruption in Developing Countries

The approach that the effective fight against corruption requires, strong political will, anti-corruption strategy, institutional setup, adequate resources (human and financial), effective legal framework, and general public support (Bartkus, 2012: 42), is indisputable. However, if there is no political will for improvement of anti-corruption reforms, none of the conditions mentioned above will be functional in decreasing corruption. For example, political will affects creation of anti-corruption regulations, as well as their implementation. But it is not enough to enact a law if there is no political will for its application. The conclusion of OECD and the Council of Europe's Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) (Batory, 2012: 66–67) is that developing countries have no lack of anti-corruption laws. Most countries in the world have adopted anti-corruption laws. Many of these laws are state of the art. But they are not uniformly observed or enforced. And, sometimes both government officials and business act as though they are above these laws. In worst cases, they can operate with a kind of immunity from the law (Reinforcing Political Will to Fight Corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, High-Level Meeting 2012: 30).

It can be observed that in developing countries, there is no lack of anti-corruption rhetoric either (Kpundeh and Dininio, 2006: 42). There is even too much of it. However, there is no political will for the improvement of anti-corruption reforms. The main factor which is decelerating successful realization of anti-corruption activities in developing countries is the lack of political will (About this problem generally: Brinkerhoff, 2000: 240; in the countries in Asia: Quah, 2015; in Latin America countries: Ruhl, 2011: 48; in Ukraine: Derevyanko, 2012: 36; in Nigeria for the restriction of anti-corruption agencies' actions, see Umar et al., 2017). This is why it is very important to investigate the matters of political will while analyzing the subject of combating corruption in the developing countries.

Political Will

Inapplicability of (P) principal-agent (A) concept in most developing countries can be seen through the analysis of the term "political will" as one of the important determinants of any anti-corruption policy. In many developing countries, there is a lack of honestly interested parts ready for enforcement and implementation of effective measures of anti-corruption politics. While political leaders can publicly support the reforms, legal and political will for combat against corruption in many countries is partial, doesn't exist, or is inconsistent. In some countries, anti-corruption policy and programs for combating corruption are used in order to remove or discourage political or economic rivals, for consolidating and maintaining of exiting systems of power and patronage, and to enable the maintaining of corruption, especially on elite level (Carson and Prado, 2016: 57).

Defining the term political will directed toward the improvement of anti-corruption strategies starts from the definitions based on the *principal-agent* model. The main characteristic of these definitions is that political will is observed as a manifestation equally divided among all subjects of society. When the term political will is defined, all subjects have the same "power, influence, and importance," and there are no differences between the strength and influence of governments' political will and political will of nongovernment sector. The final conclusion from this assumption is that there is the same level of responsibility for both the government and civil sector for the realization of political will in practice.

For example, Kpundeh defines the term political will in the same way in the papers published at different periods of time: "political will", as the concept is discussed here, refers to the demonstrated credible intent of political actors (elected or appointed leaders, civil society watchdogs, stakeholder groups, etc.) to attack perceived causes or effects of corruption at a systemic level. It is a critical starting point for sustainable and effective anti-corruption strategies and programs. Without it, governments' statements to reform civil service, strengthen transparency and accountability, and reinvent the relationship between government and private industry remain mere rhetoric (Kpundeh, 1998: 92; Kpundeh and Dininio, 2006: 41). The focus is on the motives and actions of political actors in support of anti-corruption reforms (Kpundeh and Dininio, 2006: 41). Quath had the same point of view and opinion: "Political will can be generated from the top down by the government and public agencies and/or from the bottom up by civil society organizations and the mass media" (Quah, 2015: 15).

In the developed countries, where independent institutions of democratic society function well and the civil service sector is developed, there is a strong control of executive authorities and independent work of anti-corruption institutions, so it is possible to implement P (principal)-A (agent) model to define political will. In these countries, there is a possibility to generate political will for corruption control which has the same social power and influence in both directions: "from the top down by the government" and "from the bottom up by civil society."

Such a model is not possible in developing countries, and we should bear in mind that the absolute majority of this planet's population lives in developing countries. (More than six billion people live in countries with a serious corruption problem – Transparency International report 2015.) Could we possibly compare political will (and strength) of a dictator (absolutist) from Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe, or some other country who has all the power and control with the political will of unsatisfied citizens who have no other solution when they want to object against corruption (from an objective point of view), except to protest in the streets? Undoubtedly the proportion of strength of political will is not equal in the two opposing categories of actors. One should also bear in mind the restricted influence of nongovernment organizations (NGOs) in developing countries where these organizations are very often the government's alibi for its corrupt practices.

For the understanding of political will and the improvement of anti-corruption policy in developing countries, definitions which do not favor P-A model (principal-agent) but emphasize leading role of authorities are more adaptable, for example, political will as "the extent of committed support among key decision makers for a particular policy solution to a particular problem" (As emphasized by BS). This definition is useful because it dissects the concept of political will into these four components: (1) a sufficient set of decision-makers, (2) with a common understanding of a particular problem on the formal agenda, (3) who are committed to supporting and (4) a commonly perceived, potentially effective policy solution (Post, Raile, and Raile, 2010: 659, cited by Quah, 2015: 12). For the purposes of this paper, the definitions stated by Brinkerhoff are also acceptable: "Political will refers to the intent of societal actors to attack the manifestations and causes of corruption in an effort to reduce or eliminate them" (as emphasized by BS). It is defined as the commitment of actors to undertake actions to achieve a set of objectives – in this case, anti-corruption policies and programs – and to sustain the costs of those actions over time. This commitment is manifested by elected or appointed leaders and public agency senior officials (Brinkerhoff, 2000: 242). Brinkerhoff's other definition of political will is also acceptable "the commitment of actors to undertake actions to achieve a set of objectives – in this case, anti-corruption policies and programmes – and to sustain the costs of those actions over time" (Brinkerhoff 2000: 242, cited by Quah, 2015: 13).

Characteristics of Political Will in Developing Countries

Historically, political will in developing countries was manifested in practice in different ways, bearing in mind authorities' attitude toward political corruption. Political corruption was a taboo in most former communist and socialist countries. Those who indicated the problem of political corruption risked to be labeled as the "enemies of the country and the people" with all the resulting consequences. The existence of contradiction between the authorities and citizens within the society was not accepted. Criminal and corruption were interpreted as individual excesses

of the country's enemies and the remains of the previous regimes. As such, they were strictly punished. This was a reality in all communist and socialist countries during the "Cold War."

Afterward, political will was reflected in the acceptance of corruption as the marginal problem related exclusively to single excesses of individuals and not related to the system or the country's political organization. Corruption was observed as the matter of criminal law, and criminal repression of corruption was the solution. Individuals who did not have the political protection of those in power were punished. This was the dominant understanding in former socialist countries in the pre-transition period.

Until recently, political will was reflected in rhetorical acceptance of corruption in post-communist countries as a systemic phenomenon. However, there was no political interest in undertaking systemic measures for the repression of corruption (e.g., Schmidt, 2007), especially political corruption.

Today's expression of political will of the ruling parties and authorities in developing countries has changed under the influence of international factors, international donors, and international organizations (Klitgaard, 1998; Yeh, 2011) but also under the influence of actions of the public. The political authorities in developing countries today accept the existence of corruption as a systemic problem, attend international anti-corruption conferences, adopt anti-corruption laws, and found anti-corruption agencies. However, political will of political authorities is usually expressed only on the rhetorical level in order to strengthen their power, to gain political points in public, to placate external agencies (Kpundeh and Dininio, 2006: 42), and to fight the opposition and political opponents (Quah, 2015: 17; Schmidt, 2007: 217). The honest political will for corruption suppression is simulated. Anti-corruption laws are adopted, and anti-corruption agencies are founded, but there is no material or operational support for the effective work (Kpundeh and Dininio, 2006:42; Umar et al., 2017) from such agencies. People close to the ruling regime are employed in anti-corruption agencies funded by the government (practice in Serbia). The manipulation of the ruling elite and the dishonest political will result in unsatisfied citizens, a decline in anti-corruption enthusiasm, withdrawals of the citizens from anti-corruption bodies and projects, and the disappearance of ideas that corruption can successfully be combated in the country. This syndrome is all too familiar to political scientists and cynical citizenry around the globe (Kpundeh, 1998: 94). Therefore, the main characteristic of behavior of authorities in most developing countries is simulation of existence of honest political will to suppress political corruption. Ruling regime's political will is expressed via corruption politics' sabotage, failure to implement anti-corruption regulations and measures which they themselves have enacted under the pressure by international and national factors but with no real urge to implement them.

Since the "virus" of democratization and the need for equality have spread across the developing countries, political will for corruption suppression is being formed on the level of citizens becoming aware of the problem and having the determination to do something about the problem of corruption. Such political will is more or less articulated and organized, depending on the level of democratization in given

developing country. In the given context, we can speak about political will for corruption suppression from down to up. One of the main characteristics of political will for corruption suppression in developing countries is *the existence of asymmetrical, disproportional influence of political will* manifested *from the top down by the government* and *from the bottom up by civil society*.

The other characteristic of political will in developing countries is hidden or real *conflict among the various bearers of political will* directed toward corruption suppression. Political will in developing countries is characterized by different interests and motives of representatives of the authorities and citizens. Political will of ruling party and authorities is dishonest because of their need to keep all the privileges they have. It is expressed only formally, on the level of rhetoric, and it is manifested on the level of simulations. Political interests and political will are not manifested the same way by the representatives of authorities and by the representatives of civil society. The latter have the interest and the need for the democratization of society and the improvement in combating corruption. Bearing in mind the different interests and needs of the two parties, it can be concluded that in the base of political will for corruption suppression, there is a conflict (mostly hidden but sometimes visible) between the corrupt system and the civil society. "…some analysts had warned that a '*de facto* tolerance of corruption' will eventually prove socially catastrophic, through massive protest or anti-democratic regimes, in post-communist 'infant democracies'" (cited by Schmidt, 2007: 220). Apart from that, within this context, it is possible to speak about forming of coalitions for realization of political interests of all the parties involved and with various political consequences. For these reasons, it seems that the definition of political will given by Kpundeh (Kpundeh, 1998: 92; Kpundeh and Dininio, 2006: 41) would be more general (applicable to developing countries as well) if there should be the difference between the political will in the narrow and wider sense. Narrow sense of political will would include authorities and ruling regime politicians on decision-making positions. The wider sense of political will directed toward the improvement of anti-corruption policy would include members of social communities, NGOs, and political opposition organizations. One should bear in mind that the disagreements and confrontations could possibly occur between the two groups who represent political will.

Political will for the improvement of anti-corruption policy in developing countries can be *original* and *imposed* (extorted). Political will is original when it is created by the political authorities of the country in the dialogue with all the other representatives of society (opposition, civil society, citizens' initiatives). The example of Hong Kong can be used to illustrate this (Kpundeh, 1998: 105; Yeh, 2011: 635). In this case, the internal dialogue and initiatives can possibly lead to permanent progress in the area of democratization and anti-corruption policy. *Imposed*, that is extorted political will, is formed in a given developing country under the influence of international factors which, on one hand, pressure the government to start democratic and anti-corruption reforms, while on the other hand, they finance segments of civil society. In these cases, projects have no chance for real success, since there is no *original* political will and due to the forming of non-principal alliances between the representatives of the authorities and organized representatives of civil societies. The motivation of the latter is usually lucrative in essence.

On the patron-client level, political will related to corruption can be *primary* and *derived*. Primary political will is the one which is represented by the highest-level political authorities and their representatives (patron and his staff). *Derived* political will is the one which is recognized as the patron's will by those on lower steps of the governing ladder (people in managing positions, in courts of law, prosecution, the police, public sector, editors in media, and others) and which they imply in everyday practice while leading and managing the institutions they work in. (The client tries to grasp the hidden meaning, to read between the lines, to fulfill the patron's wishes and needs, to get "under the patron's skin.") There is a very good example of this practice in Serbia, where editors in media show very strict self-censorship in order not to displease the authorities and jeopardize their editorial position. Interestingly enough, there are two exceptions to the rule. First, the political will of the authorities is given the advantage over the real legal solutions (if necessary, the laws are not obeyed to a certain extent). Second, the manager or leader of the institution tries to fulfill his or her own personal corruptive ambitions while working, such as providing jobs for people from his or her personal circle, acquaintances, and relatives and performing various misuses of the position he or she has, while the patron's will is also being fulfilled by the action of the manager or leader of the institution in which he/she is employed (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007).

Regime Type and Political Will

Brinkerhoff points out that political will does not exist in a vacuum, it is a dynamic phenomenon, but it is influenced by a set of environmental factors, subject to shifts and modulations over time in the face of changing circumstances and events (Brinkerhoff, 2000: 243). The specific *regime type*, in coaction with other factors, has certain influence on the political will. It is a widespread opinion in literature apart from the fact that authoritarian regimes have a higher degree of corruption and a weaker political will to control corruption when developing democratic states are compared to developed democratic states. There are also significant differences between the states that fall into this category. Even in the states characterized by electoral authoritarianism, where there is a multiparty system and regular elections, political responsibility is compromised by formalizing the principles of a democratic society, and corruption may well be used by rulers as part of a larger strategy of political patronage. The only purpose of the elections is reinforcing and prolonging the authoritarian rule while encouraging corruption rather than reducing it (Chang and Golden, 2010: 1).

Geddes contends that authoritarian regimes differ as much from each other as from democratic political systems. He classifies authoritarian regimes as *single party*, *military*, and *personalistic*, as well as *mixed or hybrid* (Geddes, 2004, cited by Chang and Golden, 2010: 6). In his paper, Chang proves the thesis that personalistic authoritarian systems (especially those in postcolonial Africa) are the most susceptible to corruption. Even military and single-party dictatorships are less corrupt (Chang and Golden, 2010; Zaloznaya, 2015: 350). In authoritarian states

with a personalistic system of rule, the purpose of institutions and elections is not to constrain themselves but to strengthen patron-client networks and to weaken opposing parties (Wright, 2008: 342; Chang and Golden, 2010: 6). The researchers show that not all autocratic systems show high level of corruption. There are exceptions, that is, some states "as their governments were perceived to grow *more* autocratic" (Zaloznaya, 2015: 349), which successfully control corruption to a certain extent, by keeping it at an acceptable level. The examples of this are Singapore and South Korea in Asia (Quah, 2015: 16). Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina have similar historical and cultural traditions and income levels but very different levels of corruption (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016: 41).

Political will of ruling structures in autocratic states is also influenced by the time horizons. Longer time horizon, that is to say, prognosis that the existing regime will rule longer, improves the control of corruption, thus leading to its reduction and vice versa. Political instability, term limits, certain electoral defeat, and decisions to retire all reduce the time horizons (Brinkerhoff, 2000: 244–245; Kpundeh and Dininio, 2006: 44; Shim and Eom, 2008: 312). Shorter time horizon of rule does not encourage devotion to long-term issues like systemic corruption (Brinkerhoff, 2000: 245; Chang and Golden, 2010: 2).

The results of the research conducted in Belarus provide the interesting observation that autocratic regime can manipulate the political will directed toward the control of corruption by tolerating corruption in certain fields as a reward for political loyalty (e.g., in health care, secondary education, etc.), while in other fields which do not show loyalty toward ruling structures, severe control measures are applied which lead to significant reduction of corruption. The examples are universities in Belarus (Zaloznaya, 2015).

An unequal treatment of state authorities regarding corruption can be observed in Serbia. However, it is not expressed in a certain field as a whole but individually, relating to certain legal entities and persons from the business world or politicians depending on the affiliation or (non) loyalty to the centers of political power. The close relationship with the ruling structures allows the protection and tolerance of illegal and corrupt behavior. Inspection and tax control rarely visit the companies whose owners are close to the ruling authorities. Contrary to that, inspection and tax control frequently visit the companies owned by the "renegades from the authorities" or those who have publicly shown opposing opinion. Consequently, the practice shows that some legal persons are extremely successful during the rule of a specific party; however, they often go bankrupt when the ruling structure changes.

One opinion often encountered in literature is that the nature of the *ruling coalition affects the level of corruption, that is to say, that the level of corruption is decreased due to the competition in the government* (Chang and Golden, 2010:13). This is not the case in Serbia. Ruling coalitions in Serbia affect the level of corruption by weakening the control, which leads to a corruption increase. Division of power in Serbia leads to coalition agreements between parties and the division of sectors, where each party has a monopoly within the relevant ministry. In order to "keep the peace" in the government, with the aim to maintain the ruling coalition (which emerges as the primary political goal), corrupt behavior of the party members

and scandals within the sector, under control of their party, are tolerated. It is inconvenient for the government to allow the risk of premature elections due to a corruption scandal.

Corruption in developing countries is not always a matter of political will, political strategy, or schemes of the ruling regime. In fact, many regimes suffering from pervasive bureaucratic corruption are highly disorganized and declining autocracies, weakened by the mass-scale looting of state resources. Most corruption actually takes place in defiance of the state rather than as a result of informal governmental permission (cited by Zaloznaya, 2015: 350). The appearance of mass, endemic, uncontrolled corruption is especially expressed in the period of transition and political instabilities.

Indicators of Political Will

Defining the indicators of political will is one of the questions significant for the estimate of the honest dedication in combating corruption in a given state. Absolutistic, nondemocratic, corrupt systems have the need to present themselves in a positive light in front of international organizations and foreign donors. That is why the attempts to create a list of indicators and the criteria of their assessment are worthy of our attention. With this in regard, Kpundeh points out that the principal challenge in assessing political will is the need to distinguish between reform approaches that are intentionally superficial and designed only to bolster the image of political leaders and substantive efforts that are based on strategies to create change. Many well-intended regimes have engineered their own destruction through inept or ineffective efforts, while exploitative rulers have successfully hidden their motives behind a facade of cosmetic measures (Kpundeh, 1998: 99). It is not easy to assess actual political will, as it is covered, on one hand by strong rhetoric of the ruling structures, and undertaking active "anti-corruption measures" programed to fail, on the other hand. That is why Brinkerhoff rightfully argues that political will exhibits a latent quality; it is not visibly separate from some sort of action. Measuring it can only be done indirectly. Evidence of political will, therefore, is often cited ex post facto, from a retrospective point of view. This leads to one of the vexing methodological problems in examining the role of political will and reform, the tendency to engage in post hoc circular explanatory arguments (Brinkerhoff, 2000: 241).

It is not easy to create a list of indicators of political will. For instance, Kpundeh lists the following indicators in one of his older works: The first is the degree of analytical rigor that has been utilized to understand the context and causes of corruption. The second indicator relates to process: Has the regime adopted a strategy that is participative, i.e., incorporating and mobilizing the interests of many stakeholders? The third indicator is derived from the distinction between "demonstrative" and "strategic." The fourth indicator is the prevalence of incentives and sanctions. The fifth indicator of political will is the creation of an objective process that monitors the impact of reform and incorporates those findings into a strategy that ensures

policy goals and objectives. The sixth indicator is the level of structured political competition in both the economic and political spheres (Kpundeh, 1998: 99–100).

The same author presents an edited list in another paper. The first indicator of political will is the *domestic origin of the initiative*. The second indicator is *a high degree of analysis*. The third indicator is *a high level of participation* in the reform process. The fourth indicator is the *inclusion of prevention, education, and sanctions* in reform strategies. The fifth indicator is *the dedication of adequate resources* for anti-corruption reforms. The sixth indicator of political will is the *objective monitoring and evaluation* of reform efforts (Kpundeh and Dininio, 2006: 42–43).

Quah lists five indicators of political will. First, there must be comprehensive anti-corruption legislation. Secondly, the anti-corruption agencies must be provided with adequate personnel, budget, and equipment as well as operational autonomy to enable them to perform their functions effectively. Third, the anti-corruption laws must be enforced impartially, regardless of the offender's position, status, or political affiliation and without political interference. Fourth, political will exists when the government avoids the use of corruption as a weapon against its political opponents. Fifth, anti-corruption efforts must be sustained, and their impact must be monitored by the government (Quah, 2015: 13).

Not all the indicators listed in the above three lists have the same value. Some of them are general, not precise enough, and unclear. Corrupt and authoritarian government can manipulate the actual importance of certain indicators. For instance, the indicator marked as rigorous analysis of the causes of corruption in a country or high-degree analysis is imprecise. Anti-corruption bodies which are influenced by the corrupt government can always tune the analysis to suit the government's best interests. Perhaps a more precise indicator could be *the position of the given state on the corruption lists made by international organizations* which are in charge of monitoring corruption on an international level. Comprehensive anti-corruption legislation is not a reliable indicator of political will. For instance, in Serbia and in many other developing countries, anti-corruption legislation, in its essence, demonstrates quality; however, the implementation of this legislation is not satisfying. Adopted anti-corruption laws are applied partially, selectively, or not applied at all. Due to this, it would be much better to define *as an indicator the percentage of compliance of national legislation with anti-corruption legislation in developed countries, together with the degree of implementation of anti-corruption legislation in practice* what extent laws are applied (whether they are applied impartially or selectively). With regard to this, a valuable indicator could be *the efficiency and political independence of courts in corruption cases*. This indicator would comprise several parts which would be subject to establishing correlations among them and other statistical relations. The indicator would be comprised of the following parts: the number of reported criminal deeds (the citizens do not report corruption unless they have confidence in the anti-corruption policy of the state); the number of legally convicted persons; the length of the criminal proceedings (in highly corrupt states, the criminal proceedings for the cases of political corruption last for years until the statute of limitations expires); the number of cases with expired statute of limitations in correlation with the position of the convicted; convicted persons from the field of

politics, big business, persons on various levels of state authority, and management in comparison to regular citizens and those on lower-level management positions; and the relation between the pronounced sentences and sentences stipulated by law. This indicator is important since the states with corruption on a high level, as a rule, have the court system which is ineffective and selective. *Domestic origin of the initiative is a quality indicator*. Anti-corruption reforms initiated from the inside have higher chances of success than the reforms imposed by external factors. Additional quality indicators are *the dedication of adequate resources for anti-corruption reforms* and *operational autonomy*. For instance, Quah presents the research which clearly shows the existing correlation between allocating money per capita for funding anti-corruption agencies and the degree of corruption in the given country. Countries which allocate more money to anti-corruption agencies have a lower rate of corruption (Quah, 2015: 14). Indicator of the existence of political will could also be *unhindered work of investigative journalism, independent anti-corruption bodies,* etc.

Challenges in the Realization of Anti-corruption Political Will

Developing states face numerous challenges regarding the implementation of political will for improvement of anti-corruption reforms. Even when the honest idea and motivation exist, the road is long, tiresome, and most often unsuccessful. Even when the new ruling structure replaces the old one thanks to the anti-corruption campaign based on the criticism of former corrupt ruling structure, upon assuming their duties, they face numerous challenges that melt the anti-corruption promises made during the elections as the spring sun melts the snow. Numerous factors affect the disintegration of the honest political will of anti-corruption enthusiasts such as various interest groups being coalition partners in the government, tycoons and rich people who have much to lose if the corruption is eliminated, those who finance political parties and electoral campaigns, and those who, from the very start, have different motives, as well as the corrupt bureaucratic apparatus on different levels of state administration and the monopoly of vested interests on power (e.g., see Brinkerhoff, 2000: 246; Kpundeh and Dininio, 2006: 44). Compromises are the first thing each government encounters in its mandate, which represent the start of disintegration of political will. Worldwide examples demonstrate that many political leaders who assumed the ruling position on the momentum of anti-corruption rhetoric rather quickly found their place in the corruption networks of their predecessors (Persson et al., 2013: 454).

Successful anti-corruption reforms include various coalitions (NGOs, civil society, anti-corruption agencies, citizen grassroots movements) and public support. However, civil society institutions and anti-corruption enthusiasm of the citizens are weak in the developing countries (no doubt due to the fact that they have been disappointed many times in the past), which is why it is difficult to gain confidence and wide support for anti-corruption reforms. Kpundeh notes that a weak civil society

may also undermine reform and that the monumental task of reforms should be the transforming not only of institutions but also the political culture of opportunism (Kpundeh, 1998: 92, 94).

Various factors affect the weakening of political will, provided that it even exists. The time melts it and so does enjoying in the privileges and benefactions, while the affairs of the closest associates together with the ineffective judicial system, the influence of financial and organized crime, and many other factors undermine the political will. Commissioner in Hong Kong has aptly described the fragility of political will by referring to it as "a candle flame" which can be easily "extinguished by any passing political breeze" (cited by Quah, 2015: 15).

Challenges in Combating Corruption in Developing Countries

In most developing states, the institutions are ineffective in combating corruption. The main point that can be found in all the analyses, research, and papers that pertain to corruption in developing states is regardless of which part of the world the country is located, anti-corruption agencies, the police, prosecution, and courts do not fulfill their purpose with regard to combating corruption.

One of the general observations that can be found in the literature related to developing states is that there is a great gap between the laws that regulate the operation of anti-corruption bodies in the cases of corruption and implementation of legal norms in practice. For instance, Persson et al. note that "while the majority of thoroughly corrupt countries now have a strong legal anticorruption framework, they still struggle to translate those laws into practice" (Persson et al., 2013: 454). It seems that this remark is only partially true. There is no doubt that implementation of the law is less effective in the states more susceptible to corruption. One of the reasons is the lack of legal tradition and legal culture, which, according to Treisman, is more noticeable in developing countries that are outside the legal heritage of Great Britain and common-law system (Treisman, 2000: 402). However, it should not be disregarded that upon bringing anti-corruption laws in developing states and certain provisions and details, loopholes even are included in the law, which disables effective application of the law which is in accordance with the political will that aims not to approach combating corruption too seriously, thus leaving the door open for the privileged.

The main reasons of the inefficiency of the anti-corruption institutions are still political influences on the anti-corruption bodies, police, and judicial system, all of which have a significant (essential) influence on their work. Judicial system can function as the key institution in the exercise of legal responsibility only if it is politically independent from other state authorities. In accomplishing the role of combating corruption, legal decisions should be free from political influences (Camaj, 2013: 27). One of the general characteristics in a number of developing states is the absence of the distribution of power and, contrary to that, existence of the unity of power

(which is an old idea from the communist period). This enables the ruling parties and executive power to meddle in the work of all institutions, even the courts.

In the literature that studies corruption in developing states, the following statements can often be found: "Generally, the independence of these ACAs (anticorruption agencies) in most developing countries has been doubted…. In countries where corruption is extensive, the effectiveness of the judicial procedure is undermined by the activities of corrupt political elites." One observation related to Nigeria (Umar et al., 2017: 3) notes "The state has been controlled by the ruling party. The overlap between party and state is still very strong. This undermines the introduction of accountability practices" (case Mozambique) (Doig and Tisne, 2009: 383); "… in Africa, the establishment of domestic anti-corruption agencies has not been sufficient to fight corruption because those institutions do not operate independently of African leaders" (Yeh, 2011: 633); "Experience in Tanzania, as in Uganda, suggests that domestic anti-corruption agencies cannot be effective when they lack independence and are dominated by the executive branch of the national government" (Yeh, 2011: 165). Critics describe new anticorruption institutions and laws as 'toothless' and assert that corrupt high officials have little to fear, particularly because the judicial systems that are supposed to prosecute corruption are themselves weak, politicized, and corrupt (the work researches corruption in Central America; see Ruhl: 2011: 54); in the Case of India: "According to the Global Integrity Report (2009), none of the existing anti-corruption institutions are sufficiently protected from undue and excess political interference in practice. Starting with appointments to defining powers, these institutions are directly controlled by the government" (Vadlamannati, 2015: 1036); "Such findings highlight the ongoing concern that corruption is caused by the inability, or unwillingness, of state officials to comply with rules and regulations." (insights from Asia Pacific Viewpoint; see Walton, 2013: 68). "Global Integrity 2010 reports that Kazakhstan law enforcement agencies are not protected from biased intervention into personnel policy. Appointments in the Kazakhstan police are often based on non-professional criteria and party loyalties, as well as personal relationships" (Nurgaliyev et al., 2015: 141). Similar situation can be found in Serbia and other Balkan states. Ruling political parties have a dominant influence on the appointment of managing positions in anti-corruption institutions which has a significant negative influence on combating and preventing corruption. Even if the law stipulates that the job vacancy is advertised for the positions of the management, those who have political support are always appointed.

The forming of "toothless" anti-corruption agencies is a kind of an expertise of the ruling structures in developing countries where there is no political will for combating corruption. In this way the form is accomplished ("on the way to so-called democratization"), but the content and the real function of the anti-corruption agencies become senseless. Apart from the influence of human resource policy, especially the one related to the appointment of managing positions in the anti-corruption institutions, other ways are applied to sabotage combating corruption (in coaction with politicized human resources policy), for instance, the passing of the laws that limit the independence and the efficiency of anti-corruption institutions (for Ukraine, see Markovskaya et al., 2003) or the fact that anti-corruption agency

has no legal authorization to investigate corruption cases; instead it only works on prevention but without the support of the media (the case in Serbia). Anti-corruption agencies do not receive sufficient financial and logistic means for normal operation, or their human resource potential is insufficient having in mind the number of employees or their professional competences (Walton, 2013: 68; Umar et al., 2017: 1). In order to start a procedure against a corrupt person with a political influence, it is necessary to obtain permission from the relevant authority. "Prosecuting the medium and top-level bureaucrats is highly difficult because before investigating the suspect, the agencies must get permission from the same authorities against whom the case has to be investigated" (an example from India – Vadlamannati, 2015: 1036). Quah describes a special disciplinary procedure that leads against the perpetrators of corruption in China who are members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This procedure avoids regular court procedure, and the sanctions are milder. "…by protecting corrupt party members from investigation and prosecution by the procuratorates, the CCP is encouraging its members to be corrupt rather than to remain honest" (Quah, 2015: 17).

Apart from the political influences that hinder the effective operation of anti-corruption agencies in detecting and preventing corruption in developing states, police, prosecution, and courts are the institutions which are also susceptible to corruption. In the case of police corruption, for instance, we single out the example of Kazakhstan: "Kazakhstan police is one of the most corrupt public institutions and citizens believe the police to be the most corrupt organization in Kazakhstan, whose efforts are now increasingly focused on providing its own interests" (Peculiarities of the Kazakhstan corruption, 2012, cited by Nurgaliyev et al., 2015: 142). Similar situation with regard to police corruption can be observed in Indonesia, as well (Kis-Katos and Schulze, 2013) many other developing countries. In Kazakhstan and countries from the region, it was noticed even that there was a purchase of managing working positions in the police: "Thus, the price of the position of the police department chief in South Kazakhstan is 30 to 100 thousand dollars. Moreover, in the future the applicants are obliged to pay 10 thousand dollars a month. Incidentally, a similar pattern worked in the neighboring Kyrgyzstan, where positions in the police are bought and sold" (Nurgaliyev et al., 2015: 142).

Political influences on the work of the prosecution and courts in the cases of corruption are more or less expressed in a large number of developing states. A significant indicator that expresses the existence of political will for combating corruption and the indicator that points out political independence of the prosecution and courts is the data on the number of persons that were convicted of corruption under the conditions that they belong to the top class of political and economic ruling structures of the given country, provided that they did not previously become political opponents, that is, renegades from the ruling establishment. There were cases in the Balkan region when certain politicians were convicted of grand corruption and led to the termination stage (politically, economically, personally). This happened only in the cases when they became renegades from the current ruling structure after previously being a part of it (in Montenegro, Croatia, and Slovenia). Conviction of corruption is a punishment for political disloyalty to the regime. It is not a rare case

in other developing countries that anti-corruption policies and programs have been used to eliminate or discourage political or economic rivals, consolidate and maintain existing systems of power and patronage, and perpetuate corruption, especially at the elite or "grand" levels (Carson and Prado, 2016).

In Serbia there are no recorded cases of "big fish" that belong to the ruling political and economic establishment, being convicted of corruption. Court procedures have been initiated against these persons, following the arrest recorded live and broadcast on TV accompanied by great media attention. However, as a rule, such proceedings last for years until the statute of limitations expires. The following factors lead to the expiry of the statute of limitations in the cases of grand corruption in Serbia: change of the law on criminal procedure and accompanying laws (on judges and members of the jury) which leads to the starting of new procedures; change of the court council and starting the new court procedure; the results of expert associates are received after a year or more; furthermore, additional expert analysis is added and required, which prolongs the court procedure; president of the court council holds only one or two hearings during one year; changes of lawyers require time for the new lawyer to analyze the case; in the preliminary proceedings and investigation, certain procedural mistakes are made, while the defense attacks and requires that certain evidence is excluded; prosecution amends the indictment into a minor criminal deed which means that the statute of limitations automatically expires; and the prosecution decides not to continue with the proceeding without explanation. It is especially interesting that in Serbia, no one has ever (no prosecutor, no judge, no president of the court) been summoned to responsibility as the statute of limitations expired in their cases.

Higher state officers also have protection from the court prosecution and conviction of corruption. For instance, during 2015 on the territory of the Court of Appeals in Belgrade (Serbia), a research was conducted on the court cases related to the cases of bribery of police staff. Among the convicted on managing positions, there were only managers of operative level, chiefs of the sections, and commanders in police stations (15%). Among the convicted, there was nobody who had managing position of medium, high, or strategic level of management (Simonović et al., 2017). Similar situation of invincibility of high police officials who are protected from the criminal prosecution for corruption exists in other developing countries. Either the procedures are not initiated or the corruption remains unproved. For the example in Kazakhstan, see (Nurgaliyev et al., 2015: 145).

Political influences of the state, government, and ruling structure on the judicial system regarding the cases of corruption are mentioned in other developing states as well, which can be observed in various manifestations (see Doig and Tisne, 2009). For instance, the indictment or court trial is being procrastinated (for practice in Nigeria, see Umar et al., 2017: 10; for practice in India, see Vadlamannati, 2015: 1049). Due to the political influences, the judges decide not to apply the law, while the incompetency of the judges is evident. Furthermore, the fact that the judges are corrupt is tolerated as a compensation for low salaries, etc. (for practice in Southeast Asia, see Kis-Katos and Schulze, 2013: 92). Apart from the procrastination of the court proceedings in the cases of corruption, many of which end when the statute of

limitation expires, there is an evident disproportion between filed criminal charges, criminal charges initiated, and convictions, as well as disproportion between the type and the length of pronounced sentences. With this in regard, Ruhl states an interesting and essentially true observation: "Conviction rates reflect the strength of the criminal justice system as much as the level of corruption; convictions will be more frequent in high-integrity countries like Sweden than in thoroughly corrupt nations such as Zimbabwe" (Ruhl, 2011: 35). For instance, according to the data regarding Nigeria, out of the 2538 investigated cases, only 68 were convicted. This represents a conviction rate of 2.6% (Umar et al., 2017: 9). In Hungary, which has somewhat less than 10 million people, the rate of finalized court proceedings related to corruption is extremely low. Since 2005, the number of finished court proceedings and resulting convictions has varied between 200 and 500, with only 200 cases closed in 2009 – indicating both that the number of court cases overall is quite small and that proceedings often take a very long time to complete (Földes 2010, cited by Batory, 2012: 71–72). As a rule, the cases that appear before court are those of petty corruption. All of this leads to citizens losing confidence in the justice system and government measures that are undertaken in the process of corruption control. Low detection and conviction rates are undoubtedly at least partly due to the usually cited reasons such as overburdened and slow courts and under-resourced law enforcement agencies, where badly paid officers investigate corruption cases, sometimes without sufficient training and specialized expertise (Batory, 2012).

In Croatia (with the population of around 4 million people) during 2011 and 2012, anti-corruption agency USKOK filed charges against 1738 persons. Charges against 1164 persons were rejected. Indictments were raised against 443 persons. The courts issued 339 verdicts, of which 313 were convictions (Reinforcing Political Will to Fight Corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 2012: 20). In Serbia with the population of 7.3 million people in 2016, a total of 106 criminal charges were filed for three criminal deeds of corruption (3 for trading in influence, 69 for receiving a bribe, and 34 for giving a bribe). When it comes to convictions for the criminal deeds of corruption in 2016, the courts have brought a total of 103 verdicts (Table 1).

At first sight, based on the statistics, it could be concluded that Serbia does not face problems regarding corruption. It is interesting to mention the fact that in Serbia for the criminal deed of taking a bribe, quite often, the pronounced sentences are below the legal minimum predicted for this criminal deed, which means that the sentence is mitigated (Janković, 2016). This strongly contradicts the proclaimed policy of the ruling politicians that in Serbia there is zero tolerance of corruption.

Table 1 Persons convicted of the criminal deed of corruption in Serbia in 2016

	Total	Prison	Fine	Conditional sentence	House arrest
Trading in influence	3	–	–	3	–
Receiving bribe	54	21	–	9	24
Giving bribe	46	16	1	24	5

Source: The Statistical Office of The Republic of Serbia

This gap between rhetoric and practice is a widely present phenomenon in developing countries, which can also be seen on the example of Africa (Persson et al., 2010: 10).

Regarding the abovementioned arguments, it is interesting to mention risks – benefits theory described by Rose-Ackerman. According to this theory, corruption is a rational criminal deed, and the perpetrator calculates the risks and benefits of giving bribes. Thus, a well-established law enforcement can be an anti-corruption factor. Increasing the risk of detecting corruption and applying adequate sanctions have the repelling effect on the perpetrator in his cost-benefit calculus (Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Shim and Eom, 2008: 301). Theoretically, this is true; however, in developing states cost-benefit calculus functions in a completely opposite direction. Extremely low efficiency of the police in detecting this criminal deed, extremely long criminal proceedings that often end when the statute of limitation expires, mild sentences, and the invincibility of the persons with political protection have a stimulating effect on the persons prone to corruption. Therefore, starting with cost-benefit calculus theory, corrupt persons in developing states have motives to behave in such a manner, considering the fact that the probability of detecting the criminal deed is quite low and the probability of strict sentence is even lower, that is, it is almost reduced to mere theory. "In a context in which corruption is the expected behavior, the benefits of corruption should be expected to outweigh the costs, and vice versa" (Persson et al., 2010: 3).

It is interesting to mention the opinion on cost-benefit calculus, with regard to Hungary, which is presented by Batory: "These factors taken together mean that a cost–benefit calculus should clearly push the rational citizen toward not reporting corrupt practices: not only is the disclosure of wrongdoing potentially dangerous, but also likely ineffective in terms of getting a perpetrator disciplined or behind bars. It is consequently not particularly surprising that according to a 2007 Gallup poll, only 6% of respondents reported corruption when they encountered it. Low detection rates in turn weaken or remove incentives for those who engage in corruption to come forward in exchange for impunity" (see Batory, 2012: 73).

Corruption Prevention

Programs of corruption prevention in developing states usually do not give the desired results. The size of the effect of the corruption preventions is depressingly small (Treisman, 2000: 439). Anti-corruption reforms have not only failed to prevent the persistence of corrupt activities but have also created *new* opportunities and incentives for corruption (cited by Persson et al., 2013: 454). According to the results of a global research conducted in 107 countries, the majority of people around the world believe that their government is ineffective at fighting corruption and the corruption in their country is getting worse. According to the citizens, the most corrupt institutions are political parties, police, and the judicial system. The large majority of respondents in 88 countries (82%) perceived their governments to be ineffective in fighting corruption. The respondents from the 107

countries included in the survey gave the following reason for not reporting an incident of corruption that they were aware of: "I do not know where to report it," 15%; "I am afraid of reprisals," 35%; "It wouldn't make any difference," 45%; other 5% (Global Corruption Barometer 2013). (For the experience in Hungary related to the above research, see Batory, 2012.) The lack of confidence in the anti-corruption policy of the government limits citizens' participation in anti-corruption activities and programs and their willingness to report corruption. According to the citizens who responded on the question of reasons for not reporting corruption, in the process of reporting corruption of powerful people, a reprisal could lead to the loss of the job (e.g., responds from Hungary, see Batory, 2012), or, apart from losing the job, a reprisal could even be death under inconspicuous circumstances, which is a serious reason for concern (for the responds from Uganda and Kenya, see Persson et al., 2013: 459). One recent research that encompassed nearly 60,000 people across 42 countries in Europe and Central Asia indicates that almost a third of the people in the region don't report corruption because they fear the consequences (fear of retaliation or a negative backlash, such as losing one's job (Global Corruption Barometer 2016)). The concept of a *whistle-blower* has not yet become a regular practice despite being predicted by law in developing states. The risk of reprisal from being a *whistle-blower* seems to be especially present if one reports on someone in a high position (Persson et al., 2010).

Citizens Accept Corruption as a Necessary Evil and They Adapt to It

The analysis of the literature on corruption in developing states denotes that the citizens accept corruption as a necessary evil. They attempt to react to the corruption pragmatically and to adapt to the given circumstances in a highly corrupt society. "If you do not pay a bribe, you will simply be without service" (Persson et al., 2010: 16). "Well, if everybody seems corrupt, why shouldn't I be corrupt?" (see Persson et al., 2013). There is an effect of expectations in citizens related to accepting corruption as a model of behavior which additionally reinforces corruption. If citizens believe that everyone is corrupt, then they will accept corruption as a model of behavior (Batory, 2012: 75). There is also the effect of dual morality in countries where corruption is widespread. On one hand, the citizens condemn corruption, while on the other hand, they accept corruptive schemes in order to meet certain needs. "Regardless of religion, people who live in highly corrupt countries tend to condemn corruption. However, they also may feel that their own corrupt behaviour is justified given the systemic nature of the corruption" (Marquette, 2012: 24). With this frame of mind, certain authors note that corruption in developing states is innate, that is to say, it is a way of life. "Finally, both outsiders and insiders sometimes argue that particular countries or nationalities have a culture that is conducive to corruption. Russian corruption, for instance, was recently described by the columnist William Safire as 'congenital.'" According to the Argentine playwright

Mario Diament, "corruption in Latin America is not merely a social deviation, it is a way of life" (cited by Treisman, 2000: 442).

Starting from the fact that in highly corrupt countries everyone has certain benefits, primarily ruling structures, followed by the rest who have adapted to corruption schemes, Persson criticizes principal-agent theory and presents a different conceptual approach to corruption, defining it as the collective action problem of corruption, which leads to the conclusion that corruption is a problem of the whole society (Persson et al., 2010: 12).

Although this conclusion is partially true, one should not disregard the fact that the rules of the corruption game are a consequence of historical and traditional inequalities and divisions in the society. They are imposed from top to bottom, by those who have the power, the capital, the resources, state apparatus, and its mechanisms in their hands. In developing states corruption is imposed on the citizens, as were slavery and exploitation. The blame for corruption cannot be distributed equally. The thesis that corruption in developing states is a congenital phenomenon is unacceptable in the same way as the thesis on the innate criminal. Furthermore, the thesis that all citizens are prone to corruption is unacceptable, as well. Even in extremely corrupt states, there are people who are not prone to corruption, who condemn it and do not accept corruption as a way of life.

Not every person holding a high position requires bribes. It is necessary to differentiate legally and morally the role and the blame of those who ask for bribes and those who are asked to give them. There are unscrupulous persons that ask for bribes by placing citizens in a situation of extortion to a smaller or greater extent. There are cases when a doctor, a surgeon, or a corrupt predator refuses to operate on a patient in an acute life-or-death situation, before he receives a bribe from family members. What are the possibilities of family members in that situation: to report the case to the ineffective and corrupt police and prosecution or to give up on their family member or to collect the money and give it to the doctor?

International Organizations and Corruption Prevention Projects

International organization has given a significant incentive to the actualization of the matters related to the prevention of corruption in developing states. There is a significant contribution of the international organizations, including the Transparency International (TI), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), World Trade Organization (WTO), the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and certain states that fund corruption prevention projects. Under the influence and pressure of the international community, the governments of developing states ratified international anti-corruption conventions and documents and formally started to

implement anti-corruption reforms by bringing anti-corruption laws and establishing anti-corruption bodies, with the aim to gain international loans and favorable international business opportunities, in order to present the image of the country brighter than it is in reality. Considering the fact that there is a lack of serious political will of the ruling structures for the implementation of these programs, they often do not give the effects expected by the international donors and the public.

Anti-corruption bodies established in the developing states can be divided in several groups. The first group includes the bodies founded by governments or the parliaments of developing states. These are various types of anti-corruption agencies, some of which are only authorized to provide consulting services; others are responsible for prevention only; while some are authorized to perform investigation activities. Overall, their work is rated as insufficiently effective. Political corruption is out of their reach. Most often they have an entire range of limitations: they depend on political influences of the authorities; their legal status does not allow them to work effectively; they are characterized by the absence of financial, human, and technical resources (Dionisie and Checchi, 2008; Serbia, U. N. D. P. 2008). Should, at any moment, they start to work seriously and enter the sphere of political corruption, these agencies suffer repressive actions by their own government (e.g., the funds allocated for financing the agency are reduced by half; for the example of Slovenia, see Dionisie and Checchi, 2008: 15).

The second group involves anti-corruption bodies from the nongovernment organizations (NGOs) category. They are usually financed by international donors or by funds provided by certain donor states. Their independence from political influences of the governments is different. They can be independent from the government of their countries or under a minor or major influence. The significance of NGOs is estimated as very positive as they contribute to raising the anti-corruption awareness of the citizens and contribute to the development of the understanding that governments should not abuse state budget filled by the citizens' tax payments (Yeh, 2011). Nevertheless, in Russia NGOs are connected with the "color revolutions" which provide fertile ground for the Russian government to identify NGOs as undermining national security or stability (Schmidt, 2007: 220). Such understanding of the role of NGOs is also seen in other former socialist countries, both by the authorities and by citizens. Regardless of the political viewpoint, NGOs have their weaknesses, which limit the efficiency of their work to a significant extent and undermine the confidence of the citizens. NGOs implement programs, as received from the foreign donors, which are not adapted to the local context and conditions. As such these programs are doomed to failure even before they start. Additionally, NGOs focus more on leaving a good impression on foreign donors than gaining the trust of the citizens (Walton, 2013). In developing countries, for instance, in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, NGOs are a business for those involved in their work. The main motivation of the persons engaged in the NGOs is providing the financing by the foreign donors. Regarding this problem Walton writes about "the anti-corruption industry itself" (Walton, 2013). These experiences show that anti-corruption programs, themselves, can be additional sources of corruption, which results in citizens being even more disappointed and unsatisfied by the anti-corruption

policy, and they feel that combating corruption is futile. Overall, NGOs do not have enough confidence of the citizens, nor do they have significant credibility which limits their attempts to start anti-corruption actions on a wider scale.

A third group includes authentic anti-corruption initiatives and anti-corruption movements that stem from a national setting or local communities. They are a product of dissatisfaction of the citizens caused by the growing corruption of the authorities, or they are initiated by the concrete decisions of the governments and (or) corruption affairs. Since the beginning of the 1990s, in developing countries it was not unusual to see tens of thousands of citizens on the streets demonstrating their dissatisfaction with the corruption in the government and asking for resignations of various officials. The effects of these mass anti-corruption movements mostly did not give significant results. Even if they happened to cause the changes in the ruling structures, the new authorities did not change the rules of the game (Khan, 1998). Widespread access of the Internet in developing countries opens new possibilities for raising the anti-corruption awareness in citizens, especially the youth, who have access to modern communication technologies.

Conclusion

There is no "magic key" to establishing effective anti-corruption movements in developing countries (Marquette, 2012: 14). There are likely to be no instant results from attempts to prevent corruption (Nurgaliyev et al., 2015). It is necessary to accept the fact that those who are in power and who have their grasp on the economic fortune will not give up on the privileges easily nor willingly. They will apply all kinds of cunning deceptions and frauds in order to trick the opposing side, that is, the international community and the citizens of their country. Coordinates and models of behavior of the ruling structures are determined by greed, lack of morality, and lack of political will to change anything that jeopardizes their interests.

The institutions of civil society in developing states do not have the tradition and political power to assume the role of the principal and successfully control the governments of their countries. In its essence corruption is not a matter of good or bad organization, which is the basis of principal-agent theory. The problem is in the fact that corruption is not only a (criminal) legal or economic matter, but it is conditioned by tradition, culture, and morale (Marquette, 2012). It is difficult to make a principal out of a slave, a servant, or a client. Many of them are dreaming of switching places with the master. That is the reason why it happens that parties and individuals who present themselves as great opponents of corruption and come into power riding on the momentum of an anti-corruption campaign, soon after assuming the authority, also assume the corruption schemes of the previous regime.

International community and the majority of citizens of developing states have their interests in reducing the level of corruption. Corruption increases the price of investments and services and limits the democratic and economic development, and it has a tendency to spread on other regions and countries. Controlling corruption

cannot be understood as a revolutionary action of "honest" enthusiasts, but it is waging a war in trenches where gradually, step by step, field by field, maneuver space of the opponent is narrowed down. There is an interesting idea that in the attempts of combating corruption in developing countries, the international community has a role as an "external principal" with the aim to facilitate a transition from highly corrupt to less corrupt states (Persson et al., 2013: 384). A serious warning can be found in literature, which should not be overlooked. It points to the fact that the insistence on the processes of democratization in a country should not be separated from the process of introduction of anti-corruption reforms. These processes should go hand in hand, from the very beginning, as otherwise corruption will be built in the democratic processes and the reform (Doig and Tisne, 2009). This is precisely what happened in the Balkan states after the disintegration of former Yugoslavia. The international community was interested in ending the conflicts and introducing democratic processes. The matter of anti-corruption reforms was left waiting. As a consequence, "democrats" assumed power, and soon they adopted the corruption schemes, which was in contradiction to the reform processes, while the corrupt model of behavior was deeply rooted. A significant part of the funds "pumped in" the Balkan states by the international community ended up in private pockets.

If combating corruption is understood as waging a war in trenches, chances of success are reserved for those strategies that involve gradual narrowing down of the space for corruption by exerting smaller or greater pressure of the international community on the governments of developing countries. It is necessary to go past the stage of bringing anti-corruption norms and start their implementation. Modernization of administration, that is, the support to introduction of e-administration, represents a field that can show an evident improvement relatively quickly (Cho and Choi, 2004; Prasad and Shivarajan, 2015: 24; Soans and Abe, 2016: 53). Better control of international funding, insisting on internal financial control, the improvement of the rule of law (insisting on "frying a few big fish," Klitgaard, 1998), and support to investigative journalism and freedom of media are long-term strategies, as well as support to authentic (original) civil anti-corruption initiatives. Contribution to raising the awareness of the public in this process can be very significant. For now, there are no prompt and revolutionary solutions.

Discussion Questions

1. What are the consequences for a developing country that experiences a high level of corruption?
2. Explain the principal-agent (P-A) model of corruption and the patron-client model of corruption.
3. Which of the two models better explains corruption in developing countries?
4. Define political will, and explain the role of political will in combating corruption in developing countries that are in the process of becoming democracies.
5. Discuss the challenges that must be overcome when attempting to implement effective anti-corruption programs in developing countries.

6. Why are some anti-corruption agencies and programs found in developing countries considered to be "toothless"?
7. Why are the police and the courts in developing countries generally ineffective in combating corruption?
8. Discuss the reasons why the laws enacted in developing countries to combat corruption are generally not very effective. Why do the laws fail to achieve their purpose?
9. Discuss the reasons why the citizens of developing countries tolerate corruption in the government and public service agencies.
10. Discuss the role of the international community in preventing corruption in developing countries.

References

Angeles, L., & Neanidis, K. C. (2015). The persistent effect of colonialism on corruption. *Economica, 82*(326), 319–349.
Bartkus, Ž. (2012). Fight against corruption in Lithuania – Achievements and future directions, In: *Reinforcing political will to fight corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia*, High-Level Meeting (2012). OECD Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 10 December 2012, Paris, France. http://www.oecd.org/corruption/acn/ACNHighLevelMeeting_10Dec2012_Report.pdf
Batory, A. (2012). Why do anti-corruption laws fail in Central Eastern Europe? A target compliance perspective. *Regulation & Governance, 6*(1), 66–82.
Bauhr, M., & Nasiritousi, N. (2012). How do international organizations promote quality of government? Contestation, integration, and the limits of IO power. *International Studies Review, 14*(4), 541–566.
Bhattacharyya, S., & Hodler, R. (2015). Media freedom and democracy in the fight against corruption. *European Journal of Political Economy, 39*, 13–24.
Blackburn, K. (2012). Corruption and development: Explaining the evidence. *The Manchester School, 80*(4), 401–428.
Brinkerhoff, D. W. (2000). Assessing political will for anti-corruption efforts: An analytic framework. *Public Administration & Development, 20*(3), 239.
Camaj, L. (2013). The media's role in fighting corruption: Media effects on governmental accountability. *The International Journal of Press/Politics, 18*(1), 21–42.
Carson, L. D., & Prado, M. M. (2016). Using institutional multiplicity to address corruption as a collective action problem: Lessons from the Brazilian case. *The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 62*, 56–65.
Chang, E., & Golden, M. A. (2010). Sources of corruption in authoritarian regimes. *Social Science Quarterly, 91*(1), 1–20.
Charron, N. (2011). Exploring the impact of foreign aid on corruption: Has the 'anti-corruption' aid been effective? *The Developing Economies, 49*(1), 66–88.
Cho, Y. H., & Choi, B. D. (2004). E-government to combat corruption: The case of Seoul metropolitan government. *International Journal of Public Administration, 27*(10), 719–735.
Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2016). Corruption in international business. *Journal of World Business, 51*(1), 35–49.
Derevyanko, A. (2012). Preventing corruption in Ukraine, In: *Reinforcing political will to fight corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia*, High-Level Meeting (2012). OECD Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Organisation for Economic

Co-operation and Development, 10 December 2012, Paris, France. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/corruption/acn/ACNHighLevelMeeting_10Dec2012_Report.pdf

Dionisie, D., & Checchi, F. (2008). Corruption and anti-corruption agencies in Eastern Europe and the CIS: A practitioners' experience. *Bratislava: United Nations Development Programme*.

Doig, A., & Tisne, M. (2009). A candidate for relegation? Corruption, governance approaches and the (re) construction of post-war states. *Public Administration and Development, 29*(5), 374–386.

Fokuoh Ampratwum, E. (2008). The fight against corruption and its implications for development in developing and transition economies. *Journal of Money Laundering Control, 11*(1), 76–87.

Global Corruption Barometer. (2013). Transparency International, from http://www.wingia.com/web/files/news/61/file/61.pdf

Global Corruption Barometer. (2016). ECA_EN, Transparency International, from http://www.transparency-se.org/161110_GCB-ECA-Report_web.pdf

Hope, K. R. (2000). Corruption and development in Africa. In K. R. Hope & B. Chikulo (Eds.), *Corruption and development in Africa* (pp. 17–39). London: Palgrave.

Janković, S. (2016). Penal policy of courts for the criminal deed of bribe taking. In S. Bejatović et al. (Eds.), *European Integration and Penal Law* (pp. 211–221). Belgrade: Serbian Association for Legal Theory and Practice.

Khan, M. (1998). The role of civil society and patron-client networks in the analysis of corruption. In *Corruption and integrity improvement initiatives in developing countries UNDP*. New York: UNDP-OECD Development Centre.

Kis-Katos, K., & Schulze, G. G. (2013). Corruption in Southeast Asia: A survey of recent research. *Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, 27*(1), 79–109.

Kitschelt, H., & Wilkinson, S. I. (Eds.). (2007). *Patrons, clients, and policies: Patterns of democratic accountability and political competition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Klitgaard, R. (1988). *Controlling corruption*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Klitgaard, R. (1998). International cooperation against corruption. *Finance & Development, 1998*, 3–6.

Kpundeh, S. (1998). Political will in fighting corruption. In *Corruption and integrity improvement initiatives in developing countries UNDP*. New York: UNDP-OECD Development Centre.

Kpundeh, S., & Dininio, P. (2006). Political will. In R. Stapenhurst, N. Johnston, & R. Pelizzo (Eds.), *The role of parliament in curbing corruption*. Washington, DC: The World Bank Retrieved from https://www.agoraparl.org/sites/default/files/the_role_of_parliment_in_curbing_corruption.pdf

Markovskaya, A., Pridemore, W. A., & Nakajima, C. (2003). Laws without teeth: An overview of the problems associated with corruption in Ukraine. *Crime, Law and Social Change, 39*(2), 193–213.

Marquette, H. (2012). 'Finding god' or 'moral disengagement' in the fight against corruption in developing countries? Evidence from India and Nigeria. *Public Administration and Development, 32*(1), 11–26.

Moran, J. (2001). Democratic transitions and forms of corruption. *Crime, Law and Social Change, 36*(4), 379–393.

Nurgaliyev, B., Ualiyev, K., & Simonovich, B. (2015). Police corruption in Kazakhstan: The preliminary results of the study. *Review of European Studies, 7*(3), 140–148.

Persson, A., Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2010). The failure of anti-corruption policies a theoretical mischaracterization of the problem. *QoG Working Paper Series, 19*(10), 1–2 from http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1350/1350163_2010_19_persson_rothstein_teorell.pdf

Persson, A., Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2013). Why anticorruption reforms fail—Systemic corruption as a collective action problem. *Governance, 26*(3), 449–471.

Potz, B., Sporer, D., Zirgoi, C., & Burbeck, B. (2016). Falsified prospect theory in the context of corruption and foreign direct investment. In M. Edelbacher, P. Kratcoski, & B. Dobovšek (Eds.), *Corruption, fraud, organized crime, and the shadow economy* (pp. 81–90). Boca Raton, London, New York: CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group.

Prasad, A., & Shivarajan, S. (2015). Understanding the role of technology in reducing corruption: A transaction cost approach. *Journal of Public Affairs, 15*(1), 22–39.

Quah, J. S. (2015). The critical importance of political will in combating corruption in Asian countries. *Public Administration and Policy, 18*(2), 12–23.

Reinforcing Political Will to Fight Corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, High-Level Meeting (2012). OECD Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 10 December 2012, Paris, France. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/corruption/acn/ACNHighLevelMeeting_10Dec2012_Report.pdf

Rock, M. T., & Bonnett, H. (2004). The comparative politics of corruption: Accounting for the east Asian paradox in empirical studies of corruption, growth and investment. *World Development, 32*(6), 999–1017.

Rose-Ackerman, S. (1978). *Corruption: A study in political economy*. New York: Academic Press.

Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). *Corruption and government: Causes, consequences and reform*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ruhl, J. M. (2011). Political corruption in Central America: Assessment and explanation. *Latin American Politics and Society, 53*(1), 33–58.

Schmidt, D. (2007). Anti-corruption: What do we know? Research on preventing corruption in the post-communist world. *Political Studies Review, 5*(2), 202–232.

Serbia, U. N. D. P. (2008). The fight against corruption in Serbia: An institutional framework overview, April.

Shim, D. C., & Eom, T. H. (2008). E-government and anti-corruption: Empirical analysis of international data. *International Journal of Public Administration, 31*(3), 298–316.

Simonović, B., Djurdjević, Z., & Janković, B. (2017). Profile of police officers convicted of bribery. *Revija za kriminalistiko in kriminologijo*. *Journal of Criminal Investigation and Criminology/ Ljubljana, 6*(4), 371–384.

Soans, A., & Abe, M. (2016). Bribery, corruption and bureaucratic hassle: Evidence from Myanmar. *Journal of Asian Economics, 44*, 41–56.

Tolstoy, L. (1996). Anna Karenina, Retrieved from http://ilibrary.ru/text/1099/index.html

Transparency International. (2000). *TI sourcebook. Confronting corruption: The elements of a national integrity system*. Berlin: Transparency International.

Transparency International. (2016). https://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption#define

Transparency International report. (2015). Retrieved from https://www.transparency.org/cpi2015/

Treisman, D. (2000). The causes of corruption: A cross-national study. *Journal of Public Economics, 76*(3), 399–457.

Uberti, L. J. (2016). Can institutional reforms reduce corruption? Economic theory and patron–client politics in developing countries. *Development and Change, 47*(2), 317–345.

Umar, I., Samsudin, R. S., & Mohamed, M. (2017). Appraising the effectiveness of economic and financial crimes commission (EFCC) in tackling public sector corruption in Nigeria. *Journal of Advanced Research in Business and Management Studies, 7*(2), 1–12.

UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/62/202. (2007, February 29). Retrieved from http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/1969017.68445969.html

Vadlamannati, K. C. (2015). Fighting corruption or elections? The politics of anti-corruption policies in India: A subnational study. *Journal of Comparative Economics, 43*(4), 1035–1052.

Walton, G. W. (2013). An argument for reframing debates about corruption: Insights from Papua New Guinea. *Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 54*(1), 61–76.

World Bank. (2000). *Helping countries combat corruption: Progress at the World Bank since 1997*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Wright, J. (2008). Do authoritarian institutions constrain? How legislatures affect economic growth and investment. *American Journal of Political Science, 52*(2), 322–343.

Yadav, V. (2012). Legislative institutions and corruption in developing country democracies. *Comparative Political Studies, 45*(8), 1027–1058.

Yeh, S. S. (2011). Ending corruption in Africa through United Nations inspections. *International Affairs, 87*(3), 629–650.

Zaloznaya, M. (2015). Does authoritarianism breed corruption? Reconsidering the relationship between authoritarian governance and corrupt exchanges in bureaucracies. *Law & Social Inquiry, 40*(2), 345–376.